My PhD thesis consists of three independent essays on the design of matching markets, with a primary goal to understand how information interacts with matching mechanisms especially in the applications to school choice and college admissions.

The first chapter of my thesis, *Timing of Preference Submissions: A Market Design Approach*, compares theoretically the Boston mechanism and the deferred acceptance mechanism when taking into account that students may face different levels of uncertainty about their own priorities when submitting preferences, one important variation from the complete information assumption. I show that when there is (some) uncertainty about priorities, as in the case of pre-exam and pre-score submissions, students are weakly better off in the Boston mechanism. Moreover, there is less sorting in terms of academic abilities, and therefore a better mix of students in the Boston mechanism under pre-exam and pre-score submissions.

The second chapter of my thesis, *Self-selection in School choice*, ponders if it is really true that students always submit preferences truthfully when the mechanism in place is strategyproof. Using both theory and data, we show that strategic behavior may arise when students submit preferences before knowing their priorities and this leads to a substantial welfare loss especially on students from low socioeconomic backgrounds.

The third chapter of my thesis, *Time-constrained School Choice*, studies a new mechanism that is sequentially implemented that can encourage truth-telling behavior as compared to deferred acceptance mechanism. We identify both negative and positive effects, and show overall imposing time constraint on the sequential mechanism generates deficiency which may undermine the effectiveness of introducing such mechanism.