This thesis has three chapters with quite different topics.

In the first chapter model, we show first that under specific assumptions a firm may have an interest to subcontract tasks either to decrease its production cost or to increase the quality of its product. In a more elaborate framework where surplus negotiation are such that the workers’ wages are linked with each other, we generalize this result by showing that the firm's objective is to reduce the variance in quality requirement of the tasks performed in house. Therefore the firm optimal strategy is to focus on tasks having the same quality requirement than her core business. This strategy is all the more interesting that (a) they are few tasks to subcontract, (b) they present a large differentiation in terms of quality and few specific requirements regarding their realization and (d) the tasks are not complementary with each other.

In the second chapter, we assume both that the individual returns of the agents belonging to the same team are neither deterministic, nor verifiable and that a principal is not able to commit ex ante to not intervening in the agents' work ex post. Then we show that in such circumstances, the principal's monitoring may not be efficient due to the risk of abuse of authority and incentives scheme are efficient only for small teams. Therefore we present an alternative management system: if the principal transfers simultaneously control and income rights to the agents of his team, he can organize a peer monitoring system such that he can commit de facto to the monitoring intensity and gives optimal autonomy to the agents of his team. Then we show the system the principals chooses depends on the team size: for small team, the first-best is the incentive scheme, for large teams the only efficient solution will be principal’s monitoring (with reduced motivation), between this two extremes, the peer monitoring system is the best alternative.

In the third paper, we propose a theoretical framework to analyse the impact of technological progress on the labour market. To do so, we take into consideration both a skill-obsolescence effect on the labour supply and a biased enhancing effect on the labour demand. In this context, we see how technological progress can lead to a reduction of the low-skilled workers employment even if it generates production growth in all sectors. Afterwards, we show this reduction of employment can be prevented by the government if it switches a share of the fiscal burden from low-skilled workers to "their" capital equipment and to sectors working mainly with high-skilled workers.