

Bribe-taking in the public service: a lab-in-the-field experiment in Burundi*

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Abstract

This paper explores the effect of anti-corruption messages on corrupt behavior and public service delivery. In a novel lab-in-the-field experiment, 527 public servants from Burundi were asked to allocate rationed vouchers between anonymous citizens; some of these citizens attempted to bribe the public servants to obtain more vouchers than they were entitled to. Two groups of public servants were randomly exposed to short messages about good governance or professional identity reminders. Participants in these two groups behaved in a fairer manner than those of a third group who were not exposed to any message. The result is more robust in the case of the group exposed to the professional identity reminder. The underlying mechanisms seem to be that when a public servant reflects upon governance values and her professional identity, the moral cost increases, prompting more equal service delivery. Bribe-taking was not impacted by the messages. The experiment provides new insights into the design of anti-corruption strategies.

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1 Introduction

There is a widespread consensus that the practice of corruption generates negative externalities which jeopardize economic development and damage social life.¹ In low-income and fragile countries, curbing corruption in the public service has become a key objective of international aid and reformist politicians. One of the most common (and low-cost) strategies to discourage citizens and public servants to engage in bribery in developing countries is to implement awareness raising campaigns. However, success of such sensitization initiatives remains difficult to assess. Awareness campaigns may be effective to communicate information, but one can wonder about their effectiveness in actually influencing people's behavior. Besides, research in psychology and behavioral economics show that not only the content, but also the framing of a conveyed message may be of crucial importance to influence behavior. In this paper, we explore the idea that using public good or professional identity messages to raise the awareness of public servants about their behavior in corrupt situations may be an interesting tool to promote good governance in public service delivery.

In the last decades, an extensive body of literature has been concerned with the monetary and non-monetary incentives behind corrupt actions (Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). More recently, experimental studies on anti-corruption focused on different strategies, such as top-down and grassroots audit/monitoring, staff rotation, sanction enforcement, or transparency of information (Abbink, 2004; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Olken, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010; Di Falco et al, 2016). Other studies, which do not focus specifically on corruption, provide interesting cues as to how to improve unethical behavior. On the one hand, natural field experiments found that using different type of messages as reminders for taxpayers was useful to enhance tax compliance (Wenzel, 2005; Hallsworth et al, 2017). On the other hand, social psychology studies on dishonesty suggest that priming people on their self- and/or professional identity may reduce their propensity to cheat (Mazar et al, 2007; Bryan et al, 2012; Cohn et al, 2014). Building on this recent research, the present paper investigates the impact of messages on good governance and professional self-identity — understood as how a person perceives him/herself as a professional — in a situation where public servants face a bribery attempt. In addition to contributing to the field of corruption economics, we also hope that our study can provide impetus to new and more efficient anti-corruption strategies.

In the experiment reported below, we investigate bribery in the context of a laboratory experiment in which actual Burundian public servant partic-

¹Corruption hampers economic growth (Mo, 2001; Fisman and Svensson, 2007), jeopardizes social cohesion and welfare (Chan et al, 2006), and increases inequalities (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002).

ipants were asked to allocate rationed public service between citizens. Not only did our scenario seek to understand when public servants engage in bribe-taking, but also how a bribe offer affects their delivery of a public service. Are individuals who are reminded of good governance or of their professional identity, in our case being a public servant, less likely to take a bribe? How do the messages impact their public service delivery?

We found evidence that corruption awareness messages, in particular those reminding public servants of their professional identity and the qualities expected from it, influence public service delivery, i.e. vouchers allocation, but not the propensity to accept bribes. Moreover, the public service branch where the participant actually works matters, and, participants seem to separate the dimensions of inequality and bribe-taking, which also correlate with different socio-demographic variables. The first section of this paper locates our research within the experimental anti-corruption literature, explains the use of identity reminders, and situates the experiment in the context of Burundi and its public service. The experimental design is described in the second section. The empirical analysis is described in the third section and results are presented in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses the potential mechanisms that underpin the results. The last section concludes and presents policy implications.

2 Background

2.1 Literature

Corruption, which can be defined as ‘the abuse of entrusted powers for private gain’,² occurs at different levels and under different guises, such as bribery, nepotism, regulatory capture, etc. Among these, bribery of low-level public servants is probably the most frequent form of corruption experienced by ordinary citizens, especially in low-income and fragile settings (Noonan, 1988; Justesen and Bjornskov, 2014). Experimental studies, including the lab-in-the-field approach of this paper, constitute a promising approach to understand corruption dynamics, and provide first-hand information on individual corrupt behavior (Treisman, 2007; Barr and Serra, 2009; Abbink and Serra, 2012).

A number of anti-corruption strategies have been tested, both on the field and in the lab. A first strand of the literature looks at audit, monitoring, and the enforcement of sanctions. To name just a few, Ferraz and Finan (2008) claimed that auditing of Brazilian municipalities improved governance because mayors feared not getting re-elected. After comparing anti-corruption initiatives in Indonesian municipality management, Olken (2007) argued that top-down auditing was more cost-effective than grassroots monitoring. Fis-

²Transparency International, www.transparency.org/glossary/term/corruption.

man and Miguel (2007) found that UN diplomats were more likely to pay their parking tickets in New-York City once immunity sanctions were enforced. These studies provide excellent evidence to improve institutional design and boost good governance. However, their recommendations are often costly and complicated to implement.

Another strand of the literature considers information transparency, which is often less expensive and also closer to our interest in message strategy. Experiments in Uganda, India and Tanzania found that transparency impacts and sometimes decreases corrupt behavior (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010; Di Falco et al, 2016). In a country-wide field experiment, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) tracked expenditures related to a large education program in Uganda. They found that a newspaper campaign on the capture of this program’s grant by local public officials was successful in reducing the amount of public funds routinely diverted from the beneficiaries. Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) designed a randomized control trial in New Delhi on slum dwellers who are eligible to receive food vouchers from the government, but typically struggle with public servants to obtain them. They showed that using the ‘Right to Information Act’ with public servants was almost as effective as offering them speed money to get access to the vouchers. Particularly relevant to the present paper is Di Falco et al (2016)’s experiment on embezzlement in Tanzania. They found that, when the transfer chain of intermediaries between donor and beneficiary is shorter, transparency of information about the donor’s initial donation reduces the amount withdrawn by intermediaries. Importantly, Di Falco et al. suggest that transparency renders dishonest behavior more salient, which increases moral costs and hence, damages intermediaries’ self-image, in case they chose to embezzle.

Experiments conducted in the lab show that context and participants’ experience matter to influence behavior. Barr and Serra (2009) found evidence of framing and negative externalities effects. In the lab, public official participants were more likely to reject bribes within the frame of a petty bribery scenario featuring the roles of private citizens and public officials. Alatas et al (2009) had students and actual public officials participate to the same bribery experiment. They found that public officials tolerated corruption less than the students in this experiment, and suggested that this difference in behavior is due to the professional experience of the former. Barr et al (2009) investigated the effects of the institutional environment on corruption in public service delivery and found that accountability to the citizen and effort monitoring did reduce corrupt behavior. A result of the same study, related to the participation of Ethiopian nursing students, suggests that professional experience and norms negatively affect behavior in public service delivery.

2.2 Conceptual Framework and Rationale

Donors and governments frequently use corruption awareness as part of their toolbox to improve the governance of fragile states. While sensitization messages are a non-expensive tool to try to influence behavior, their effectiveness in fighting corruption is still not established. That said, natural field experiments conducted to address tax payment issues did find a positive impact of short messages targeting the taxpayer on tax collection (Hallsworth et al, 2017). The first objective of our study is to investigate the effectiveness of anti-corruption messages by observing two behaviors: bribe-taking and service delivery. Most bribery experiments link these two dimensions very closely, and assume that accepting a bribe generally leads to providing the favour requested by the briber. Yet, in contexts where the briber has little leverage on the bribe-taker and corruption is widespread, there is no reason to believe that reciprocity will be automatic and proportional. Accordingly, messages and campaigns targeting the governance of the public servants do not necessarily impact these two dimensions in the same way.

Our second objective is to pay attention to the phrasing of anti-corruption messages, with a particular attention to the identity of the bribe-taker. The corruption phenomenon involves not only institutional, but also individual dimensions. Personal and social characteristics (e.g. age, experience, religion or gender) constitute the identity of an individual, known to influence behavior related to corruption (Swamy et al, 2001; Serra, 2011; Armantier and Boly, 2013). In social psychology, social identity is defined as the part of an individual's self-concept that stems from her awareness of belonging to a social group (Tajfel, 1978). One's identity is also a matter of self-definition, as captured by Baumeister (1999)'s definition of self-identity in terms of 'the individual's belief about himself or herself, including the person's attributes and who and what the self is'. This concept of identity is potentially crucial for understanding when an individual engages in corrupt behavior. In economics, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have stressed that agents make economic decisions not only on the basis of rational incentives, but also in relation to their identity and self-image. These authors incorporate an identity component into the classic utility function, so that utility increases when a person's behavior corresponds to their ideal self. This idea is consistent with experiments in social psychology that have shown that priming individuals on their identity influences ethical behavior. Mazar et al (2007) argue that people who take a bad action deploy unconscious strategies to distance their self-identity from their unethical behavior. People behaving unethically will typically disconnect their actions from their identity, minimizing or denying harmful actions. In line with this idea, Bryan et al (2012) observed a decrease in cheating behavior when asking the participants of a game not to be cheaters, rather than simply asking them not to cheat. Even though this experiment did not directly bear on corruption, it provides an

important insight that echoes theoretical findings on the importance of one's (perceived) identity in economic and social behavior (Schlenker, 1982). In a recent study on bankers' social norms in Switzerland, which also used a game where cheating was possible, Cohn et al (2014) shed light on the power of professional self-identity. The results of their lab-in-the-field experiment showed that priming bankers to recall their profession increased dishonest behavior, unlike bankers who were not exposed to this priming. Other professional categories did not display the same behavior. The authors argue that the banking culture is fundamentally corrupt, and that reminding bankers of their professional identity lead them to a more dishonest behavior.

In the case of petty corruption, where negative externalities are easy to dismiss, it might be easier to deny that a bad action is taking place. In line with the aforementioned psychology literature, this paper seeks to test whether such a mechanism can also be observed in the case of corruption attempts: Are individuals who are reminded of their professional identity, in our case being a public servant, less likely to take a bribe? How does a professional identity reminder impact their public service delivery?

Most corruption experiments are conducted in laboratories with students who play non-contextualized games or are instructed to play as if they were public servants (Barr and Serra, 2009). As Serra and Wantchekon (2012) point out, a key methodological challenge is to find ways to articulate the advantages of laboratory and field research in producing contributions that can claim some level of external validity. These concerns are especially relevant to the present study, which is primarily concerned with the identity of the participants. For this reason, we decided to organize a lab in the field, where the selected participants are also the subjects of the study, i.e. public servants.

2.3 Public service in Burundi

Our experiment is set in Burundi, a fragile country where the delivery of public services and the corruption of public servants are major problems, and where there is interest in new anti-corruption strategies. Burundi ranked 159 out of 176 in the 2016 Transparency International corruption perception index. This came after the International Crisis Group denounced a worsening of the corruption crisis in 2012. Authority disruption and government failures in the last decades as well as the 1993-2005 civil wars are believed to have fueled corrupt behaviors. Reports, such as the one published in 2007 by International Alert and GRADIS, find feelings of restrained anger and resignation towards corruption in all regions of the country. It also highlights the dramatic consequences of petty corruption in political, economic, and also social aspects of life in Burundi.

A series of anti-corruption initiatives have been undertaken in recent years; they consist in a revision of the legal framework, as well as in stricter

sanctions and measures to improve law enforcement. These include the creation of an independent tax revenue authority and a special anti-corruption police brigade ([International Crisis Group and ICG, 2012](#)). These measures, however, have proven largely insufficient and corruption has been an important theme in the 2010 and 2015 electoral campaigns. The despondency of Bujumbura residents towards rampant corruption reportedly contributed to fueling the riots of 2015 ([Humanitarian Foresight Think tank, 2016](#)).

At US\$ 600 ppp,³ Burundi's GDP per capita is one of the lowest in the world, with agriculture being the main source of income and employment for 90% of the Burundian population. The administrative system is largely inherited from Belgium, the former colonial power, and has been influenced and reformed with and by international aid support over the last decades. With few opportunities in the private sector, public service positions are highly regarded, and are seen as an easy way to climb the social ladder and become wealthier. A recent survey found that working in the public sector was the first professional aspiration of a majority of Burundian pupils ([Jeusette and Verwimp, 2017](#)). The capture of resources and the politicization of the Burundi public service are very important, and provide public servants with significant power and material advantages ([International Crisis Group and ICG, 2012](#)). Four public sectors are considered central to the general citizenry and each is perceived as corrupt in a different manner ([East African Bribery Index et al, 2013](#)). According to the East African Bribery Index, compiled by [East African Bribery Index et al \(2013\)](#), policemen score first both in terms of the likelihood to ask for a bribe and in the proportion of actual bribes as a percentage of all the bribes reported to have been paid by the sampled population (24.7%, 52%). They are closely followed by the judiciary sector (21%, 27.8%), and the education sector (12.9%, 13.2%), while with medical services appear much less corrupted (3.1%, 0.4%).

3 Experimental Design

3.1 The experiment

Participants to the present study were active public servants coming from health (clinics), education (primary and secondary schools), justice (non-judge staff at civil and criminal courts), and police sectors. The study sought to reproduce a situation of petty corruption. The bribery game scenario involved a public servant, citizens, and the distribution of a basic public service ([Barr and Serra, 2009](#)). In our design, the public service was needed by all citizens in the highest possible quantity, but it was available in limited quantity only. This rationing feature was crucial to test for equality in terms of service provision. It also mimicked a real-life situation such as:

³2012 GDP per capita Purchasing Power Parity, World Development indicators.

limited availability of places in a service (schools), or production limitations to issuing administrative documents. The experiment was not introduced to the participants as a bribery game or experiment, but rather as a study about the delivery of public services. The main participants, all actual public servants, were assigned the role of ‘public servant’ in the experiment. They were expected to deliver a public service (in the form of allocating vouchers) to ‘citizens’. The citizens, recruited among the students of the University of the Great Lakes in Bujumbura, played in a preliminary stage in a different experiment session.⁴ The experiment had the following structure.

Preliminary stage — In a separate session, the citizens made requests for vouchers. They were informed that (i) the official price for requesting one voucher was 500 Burundian Francs⁵ (BIF), (ii) each obtained voucher could be exchanged (at the end of the experiment) against BIF 1,250, and (iii) there was a rationing situation which meant that public servants might not be able to fulfil every request. The citizens could choose to make normal requests for vouchers, sending the public servant BIF 500 per voucher, or special requests with extra money, sending the public servant BIF 1,000 per voucher. These requests, along with experiment money, were then transferred to the public servants. The transfer was operated in such a way that all public servants received an identical distribution of requests. The citizens are passive players who are crucial for the credibility of the experiment: the public servants were informed that real people, also participating to the experiment, would be affected by their decisions in the experiment.

Stage 1 — The scenario was explained to the public servants. Public servants were given the task of managing the distribution of vouchers among citizens. These vouchers gave access to a public service for the citizen. It was clearly explained that (i) it is a public service that is limited in quantity (e.g. in a rationing situation), and (ii) the public service is equally needed and deserved by each citizen. According to this latter point, public servants were expected to distribute the vouchers equally among citizens, without this having been explicitly stated.

Stage 2 — Each public servant received an endowment of twelve vouchers. Public servants were instructed to distribute these twelve vouchers among three citizens (vouchers could be cashed by citizens only).

Stage 3 — Each public servant received a set three similar envelopes from the citizens; each envelope contained an anonymous written request for vouchers, as well as the corresponding payment. In each set of three envelopes, one contained a bribe. The bribe consisted in a special request for more vouchers than what a citizen was entitled to receive, as well as more money than the vouchers normally cost. That is, each public servant received

⁴The citizens are not the focus of the present article and will not be discussed in length here, as our focus is on the identity of the bribe-taker, i.e. the public servant

⁵\$1 = BIF 1,600 at the time of the experiment.

two normal requests and one special request. To sum-up, each public servant received:

- 12 vouchers giving access to the public service. Each voucher costs BIF 500 to the citizen and can be cashed in against BIF 1,250 at the end of the experiment by citizens only.
- 3 envelopes containing citizen requests:
 - 2 envelopes, each containing a request for 4 vouchers and BIF 2,000 in experiment money.
 - 1 envelope containing a special request for 6 vouchers and BIF 6,000 in experiment money.

Stage 4 — Each public servant distributed their vouchers to the citizens by putting them into the corresponding envelope. In practice, public servants were free to keep whatever amount of experiment money the citizens sent them; although the instructions indicated that only the amount of experiment money corresponding to the cost of the vouchers should be kept.

Stage 5 — Each public servant exchanged experiment money against real money at the end of the experiment.⁶

Two dimensions of corruption were observed in the experiment:

1. Bribery (price): the amount of money taken by the public servants that did not correspond to the normal cost of the delivered voucher(s).
2. Equality in public service delivery (resource allocation): the number of vouchers distributed by the public servant to each citizen.

Public servant participants were thus given the opportunity to claim the money they were not entitled to at the citizens' expense. The briber had to decide whether and how much to offer as a bribe without knowing whether the bribee, i.e. the public servant, would be willing to grant him the favor he asked for in return and the bribee was free to reject the bribe, accept and grant the favor, or accept but not grant the favor (see [Abbink et al \(2002\)](#)'s bribery game). Whenever the favor asked by the briber was granted by the public servant, other citizens lost voucher(s) and therefore money, which represents the social and economic cost of corruption.

Given that (1) public servants took part in the experiment anonymously and knew they would not be sanctioned for accepting a bribe, and (2) there was no mechanism forcing a public servant who took a bribe to reciprocate with additional voucher(s), the income-maximizing strategy for the public servant would be to take all the money, bribes included. The absence of

⁶The citizens were matched with what corresponds to the average response of public servants to their request, and were paid accordingly.

automatic reciprocity between the bribe-taker and the briber may also have consequences for voucher allocation: [Fehr and Schmidt \(1999\)](#) observed that most people behave in a fair manner when no cost is implied. If this verifies in our experiment, the fairness-maximizing strategy for our participants would be to simply respect the rules of the game and allocate the vouchers equally between citizens; the public servants did not have to allocate the vouchers unequally to pocket the maximum possible gain. This experimental context is not far from real-life situations in developing countries where anti-corruption messages would be circulated: citizens with limited social capital have little bargaining power when attempting to obtain extra or regular services from poorly monitored public servants.

In order to investigate the role of professional identity reminders, two message treatments, with a change in phrasing were introduced. While inspired by [Bryan et al \(2012\)](#)'s cheating game, our messages did not use negative and imperative wording. They were embedded with in a booklet that contained practical information distributed to the participants before introducing the experiment's rules and instructions. Messages were positive reminders about good governance behavior, notified through a written message in the native language of the participant. Booklets were distributed at the start of the session. Public servants were randomly assigned to a 'no message' treatment, a 'general message' treatment, or 'a professional identity message' treatment. The general message was based on a typical good governance statement that translates as: 'Good governance is the pillar of an equitable and uncorrupted society' (Kirundi: 'Gutwara neza ni' inkingi y'ubuntu n'iteka mu kurwanya ibiturire mu gihugu'). The professional identity message contains a subtle linguistic change, reminding participants of their professional identity, and reads: 'A real public servant is equitable and incorruptible' (Kirundi: 'Umukozi wa leta w'ukuri arangwa n'ubuntu n'iteka, akirinda igiturire'). The content of the general message and the professional identity message do not differ ethically and they come from the same external source. They are, however, expected to have a different moral load, and should affect the participant's own relationship to what they define as right or wrong. To repeat, our hypothesis is that the professional identity message makes it harder for the participant to disconnect their actions from their identity. Professional values should then be more difficult to neglect, rendering participants less prone to accept bribes or to be affected in public service delivery.

3.2 Recruitment

We already emphasized how important it is to recruit participants actually working in the public administration. All participants were public servants, deliberately not recruited from managing or senior positions (such as school principal or police officer). Leaflets and posters advertised the academic

study at workplaces (health centers, schools, ministries). They guaranteed participant anonymity and a participation fee that included travel expenses. Registration was done by phone and was conditional on whether the candidate really was a public servant (certified by his or her official public servant card) and could read and write the national language Kirundi.

Throughout each step of the study, recruitment, experiment, survey, and payment, the total anonymity of the participants was respected. The participants played in individual cubicles and were paid individually after the experiment was finished. At no point were the participants asked for their names. The post-conflict context of the country, as well as the sensitive nature of the experiment, required this condition to be fulfilled in order to encourage participation and spontaneous behavior during the game. Anonymity was also important to diminish the feeling of being observed which could influence (moral) choices during the experiment. In order to link the results of the game with the socio-demographic survey, each participant was identified with a unique number during the study.

3.3 Setting

The experiment took place in December 2013 and January 2014 in a classroom of the public University of Burundi, in Bujumbura. The experiment was one-shot and played in paper and pencil form. After the experiment, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire about their socio-demographic background. It also contained questions about their opinions regarding personal and professional values, but did not explicitly mention corruption. The experiment manager and his lab assistants were Burundians; at no point were foreign experimenters in contact with participants (Cilliers et al, 2015). The whole session was run in Kirundi to make sure that all the rules were understood and that a foreign language would not reduce the participant's emotional response (Costa et al, 2014). Participants received their payoff at the end of the session after having filled in the post-experiment questionnaire. In addition to a lump sum show-up fee of BIF 5,000 (then \approx \$3.25), the participants received between BIF 6,000 to BIF 10,000 (then \approx \$3.75 to \$6.25), depending on their decisions during the experiment. The minimum amount that could be earned during the experiment (BIF 11,000 - \$6.875) corresponds to two to three days of daily wage for the less well-paid category of public servant participating in our experiment. In the years before the experiment, court of justice clerks could earn (monthly) BIF 55,000-250,000, policemen BIF 20,000-100,000, teachers around BIF 50,000, and nurses between 50,000-150,000. A new policy introduced at the end of 2012 harmonized the salaries between BIF 110,000 and 300,000 a month, according to clear criteria of qualification and experience.

4 Empirical analysis

4.1 Descriptive statistics

The sample consists of 527 public servants whose basic socio-demographic and professional characteristics were collected through post-experiment questionnaires. As expected, Table 1 shows that the socio-demographic profiles of the public servants are often different between sectors. For instance, participants of all professional categories are more likely to be male, except in the case of the health sector, while the level of education is remarkably lower in the police sector.

Table 1 – Basic socio-demographic indicators, by professional sector

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | |
|------------------------------------|----------|------|----------|------|----------|------|----------|------|
| | nurses | | teachers | | clerks | | police | |
| | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd |
| Gender (female) ^d | 0.60*** | 0.49 | 0.15*** | 0.35 | 0.20* | 0.40 | 0.18*** | 0.38 |
| Age (in years) | 31.38*** | 7.50 | 28.27*** | 4.24 | 28.09*** | 4.50 | 31.59*** | 4.62 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| primary only ^d | 0.08** | 0.27 | 0.01*** | 0.09 | 0.02*** | 0.12 | 0.52*** | 0.50 |
| post-secondary ^d | 0.65 | 0.48 | 0.90*** | 0.30 | 0.90*** | 0.30 | 0.16*** | 0.37 |
| Catholic ^{d1} | 0.66 | 0.47 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0.66 | 0.48 | 0.59 | 0.49 |
| Member of association ² | 0.66** | 0.47 | 0.79 | 0.41 | 0.83* | 0.38 | 0.77 | 0.43 |
| Internally Displaced ^{d3} | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 0.18 | 0.39 |
| Returnee ^{d4} | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.20* | 0.40 |
| Exp. of violence ⁵ | 1.94 | 1.49 | 1.95 | 1.53 | 1.92 | 1.46 | 1.98 | 1.46 |
| Ex-combatant ^{d6} | 0.06*** | 0.24 | 0.04*** | 0.19 | 0.07** | 0.25 | 0.44*** | 0.50 |
| Fish/meat per week ^{d7} | 1.21 | 1.30 | 0.85* | 1.08 | 1.26* | 1.36 | 0.82* | 0.87 |
| Owns motorbike/card ^d | 0.19 | 0.47 | 0.12 | 0.35 | 0.22 | 0.52 | 0.10 | 0.36 |
| Internet use | | | | | | | | |
| never accessed ^d | 0.59 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.32*** | 0.47 | 0.75*** | 0.43 |
| at least monthly ^d | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0.39*** | 0.49 | 0.10*** | 0.30 |
| Level of trust ⁸ | 1.59 | 0.94 | 1.56* | 0.75 | 1.55* | 0.97 | 2.19*** | 0.97 |
| Observations | 131 | | 133 | | 131 | | 132 | |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummies. 1: non-Catholic overwhelmingly Protestant. Catholic church historically most powerful.

2: member of an association, proxy for social capital. 3: internally displaced person, left home as a

consequence of the civil war. 4: civil war refugee. 5: "In the last year, has violence prevented you

from having a normal life?" 5-item Likert scale (not at all (0) - a lot (4)). 6: civil war combatant.

Most benefited from reintegration programs. 7: "how many times a week do you usually eat fish

or meat in your household?". 8: "Generally speaking, do you think one can trust people"

5-item Likert scale, proxy for the level of interpersonal trust.

Material poverty is high, as shown by the low proportion of households that have a car or motorbike as well as the absence of fish and meat in daily

meals. The level of perceived violence is also high and reflects the fragile political situation of Burundi at the time of the experiment: 62% of the participants declared that the life of their families was disturbed by violence in the last year. The marks of the civil war are also present as one fifth of the sample identifies as internally displaced. The Burundi police forces were partly made up of ex-rebels and it is therefore not a surprise that it counts most of the returnees (repatriates) and ex-combatants. Access to the internet (and computer literacy) is low, which further justifies the pen and paper form of the experiment. The three intervention groups are overall quite well balanced with regards to those characteristics (see Table 6 in the Appendix).

Professional experience also differs between sectors (Table 2), with the police force and the nurses usually having more experience than teachers and court of justice employees. This may explain why those categories also display higher rates of promotions and salary increases. The satisfaction of the participants with their job is moderate, and about 30% of the public servants have another job on the side (shop, taxi, consultancy, etc.). This figure is much lower in the case of the policemen who are often stationed in barracks and therefore enjoy less flexibility to engage in moonlighting. The post-experiment questionnaire did not ask directly about corruption, but it did touch on the participants' opinion of what the main problems of the country are. Corruption and good governance top the list, ahead of violence and leadership. The issues of ethnic division, human resources, and infrastructure are mentioned in one third of the cases or less, and rarely ranked as top priorities. When asked who sets the example in terms of good governance in the country, public servants disagree: the president and his entourage are cited by 39% of the respondents, especially the policemen who are in part ex-rebels who fought alongside the president, but the church(es) are a more frequent choice among teachers. The survey also asked three important questions about the public servants' experience with governance training, illegal or irregular requests from citizens, and control of their work (Table 3).

Policemen (and to a lesser extent court staff) received more training on 'good governance'. This was mostly as part of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and capacity-building programs supported or implemented by international aid. Consistently with Transparency International data, the police and court clerks say that they were more exposed to irregular or illegal requests than nurses and teachers ([East African Bribery Index et al, 2013](#)).

4.2 Identification strategy

Experimental data are primarily analyzed with OLS and Logit regressions, using the following models, with experimental session fixed effect and robust

Table 2 – Work experience, by professional sector

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | |
|--|----------------|------|------------------|------|----------------|------|----------------|------|
| | nurses mean | sd | teachers mean | sd | clerks mean | sd | police mean | sd |
| Work experience (years) | 3.94 | 5.8 | 2.91** | 3.65 | 2.45*** | 2.17 | 6.65*** | 5.05 |
| Ever promoted ^d | 0.22 | 0.2 | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0.20* | 0.40 | 0.45*** | 0.50 |
| Ever had salary increase ^d | 0.41 | 0.9 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.49 |
| Job as a vocation ¹ | 3.28*** | 1.09 | 2.48** | 1.40 | 2.74 | 1.31 | 2.68 | 1.40 |
| Satisfaction with job ² | 1.96*** | 1.01 | 2.76*** | 1.17 | 2.45 | 1.02 | 2.62* | 1.11 |
| Another professional activity ^d | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.17*** | 0.38 |
| Observations | 131 | | 133 | | 131 | | 132 | |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummies. 1: “Do you feel that the job you are doing is what you wanted to do, that it is your vocation?”, 5-item Likert scale (not at all (0) - a lot (4)). 2: perception: “Are you satisfied of the work you are doing?”, 5-item Likert scale (not at all (0) - a lot (4))

standard errors clustered per session:

$$B_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_1 + \beta_2 T_2 + I_i + S_t + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$I_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_1 + \beta_2 T_2 + B_i + S_t + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Bribery (B_i) is a variable that corresponds to the bribe taken by the public servant in the OLS model. The instructions specified that the money taken should correspond to the cost of the delivered vouchers. Out of BIF 10,000 in total, a public servant is expected to take only BIF 6,000. Bribe amounts can then take values from BIF 0 to BIF 4,000, BIF 4,000 representing the maximum bribe amount. In the Logit model, Bit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the participant took more money than BIF 6,000. Inequality (I_i) is the public servant’s distribution of vouchers. The instructions specified that every citizen has an equal right to access the limited public service. Out of 12 vouchers, an equitable public servant should deliver 4 vouchers giving access to the public service to each citizen. In the OLS model, inequality level can then take values ranging from 0 to 16, according to the number of vouchers misattributed. Formally, inequality level is calculated as:

$$I_i = \sum_{j=1}^3 |V_j - 4| \quad (3)$$

These values are necessarily even, as reattributing a voucher means both depriving one player whilst favoring another. In the Logit model, I_i is a

Table 3 – Experience with corruption, by professional sector

| | (1) nurses | | (2) teachers | | (3) clerks | | (4) police | |
|---|---------------|------|-----------------|------|---------------|------|---------------|------|
| | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd |
| Ever attended a governance training ^{d1} | 0.17*** | 0.8 | 0.09**** | 0.29 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0.58*** | 0.50 |
| Exposure to irregularities ² | 1.79 | 1.0 | 1.64**** | 1.00 | 2.22*** | 0.94 | 2.06 | 1.14 |
| Controlled work ³ | 3.01*** | 0.82 | 2.33**** | 0.95 | 2.33*** | 0.97 | 2.73 | 1.01 |
| Observations | 128 | | 131 | | 128 | | 127 | |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummies. 1: often provided by international aid actors. 2: perception: “Does it happen that citizens ask you to do something for them that is not legal or permitted? How often?”, 5-item Likert scale (not at all (0) - a lot (4)). 3: perception: “How much is the job that you are doing controlled, to check that you are doing it right?”, 5-item Likert scale

binary variable that takes the value 1 if the participant allocated her vouchers in any other way than the equitable 4-4-4. T_1 is a dummy indicating whether the individual was exposed to the standard message treatment and T_2 a dummy for the professional identity message. St are fixed effects capturing session-level invariants: sessions were organized on different days but in the same room and by the same assistants.⁷ In alternative specifications, we also added, X_i , a vector of extra personal covariates that cover basic socio-demographic indicators (age, education, gender, and wealth), religion, the experience of war and violence, profession and work experience, and exposure to corruption and anti-corruption. For 75 observations, there is at least one missing answer to the questionnaire, which translates as missing values for some socio-demographic variables. We chose to replace those missing values by the mean value of the variable in the sample.

5 Results


Experiments were a novelty for all the participants. It was designed in a simple way and we recruited only participants who could read and write the national language, Kirundi. However, 35 participants (6.6% of the sample) displayed behavior that may indicate they had not understood the principles of the experiment: they did not take part of the money corresponding to the vouchers they distributed, and therefore essentially gave vouchers at a

⁷The first few sessions were played with nurses only, with the whole session being exposed to a same treatment. To avoid collinearity issues, we grouped these first four in one. For the other sessions, different professional categories and messages were mixed and session fixed effects can be used. We re-estimated all our models without the nurses and saw no major change in results.

discounted price (or for free).⁸ These 35 participants were only included in the analysis at the time of performing robustness checks.

The voucher allocations and the bribe amounts are represented in Figure 1. The most frequent case is by far that of participants taking the maximum bribe amount, but equally distributing the vouchers (67.07%). This is also the expected dominant behavior (see Section 2).

Figure 1 – Distribution of behaviors



A minority of the participants chose to reject the bribe and distribute vouchers equally, thus respecting the two rules of the experiment and being a model public servant (9.64%). Only a fifth of the participants chose to give extra vouchers to the briber when taking the bribe, which suggests that for these participants reciprocity, in terms of favor delivery, matters more for them than the rules of the experiment.

⁸Out of these 35 ‘outliers’, 11 did not take any money out of the envelopes. This behavior will be discussed in the next section. Also, 6 participants did not answer most of the basic questions in the post-experiment survey. They were not included into the main analysis under the suspicion that their literacy level might not make them eligible to participate in the experiment. All the participants who were excluded from the main analysis are included in the robustness checks.

5.1 Bribery

The overall level of bribe-taking is high: across treatment groups, 87.95% of the participants pocketed part of or the entirety of the bribe, taking on average 67.4% of the bribe (BIF 3,373). There is no significant difference between the average amount taken in the control group and the amount taken in the groups exposed to the professional identity or standard messages (OLS models 1 and 2 in Table 4). The same observation holds when considering whether the participant took any part of the bribe (Logit models 3 and 4 in Table 4).

Table 4 – Effects of the messages on bribe-taking

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit |
| Any message | 104.7 (196.9) | | 0.162 (0.448) | |
| Standard message | | 181.3 (184.3) | | 0.215 (0.418) |
| Professional Identity message | | 22.89 (232.1) | | 0.110 (0.528) |
| Allocation of vouchers (level of inequality) | 21.53 (26.21) | 21.80 (25.72) | | |
| Allocation of vouchers (1=unequal) | | | 0.320 (0.608) | 0.323 (0.605) |
| constant | 3281.8*** (175.9) | 3285.4*** (177.9) | 0.951 (0.636) | 0.954 (0.632) |
| Session fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Controls | no | no | no | no |
| N | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 |

Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors clustered per session.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.2 Public service delivery

Across all treatment groups, 76.21% of the participants chose to allocate their 12 vouchers equally between the citizens (four vouchers for each citizen). However, as shown in Table 5, the participants who were exposed to the standard or professional identity messages were less unequal in their voucher distribution.

The coefficients of the standard and professional identity messages for inequality are significant, negative, and of similar size. However, the standard errors of the professional identity coefficient are smaller in both the Logit (column 2 in Table 5) and OLS (column 4 in Table 5) models, which suggests that the professional identity message generates a more homogenous behavior.

Table 5 – Effects of the messages on service delivery (voucher allocation)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit |
| Any message | -0.469** (0.203) | | -0.448** (0.195) | |
| Standard message | | -0.496* (0.279) | | -0.520** (0.253) |
| Professional Identity message | | -0.441** (0.148) | | -0.370** (0.173) |
| Bribe-taking (in BIF 1,000) | 0.0549 (0.0693) | 0.0557 (0.0681) | | |
| Bribe-taken (1=unequal) | | | 0.323 (0.606) | 0.325 (0.604) |
| constant | 1.118*** -0.469** | 1.114*** | -0.807** -0.448** | -0.817** |
| Session fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Controls | no | no | no | no |
| N | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 |

Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors clustered per session.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

In line with Figure 1, the results of Tables 4 and 5 confirm that there is no correlation between bribe-taking and public service delivery (i.e. vouchers allocation).

5.3 Characteristics associated with bribe-taking and fairness

The post-experiment survey provides further information. The vector of covariates X_{it} , which gathers personal characteristics for each participant, is simply added to equations (1) and (2). Tables 8 and ??, in the Appendix, presents the estimation results. In addition to confirming the effects of the professional identity and the standard messages, results show that the different professional categories behave, in average and across treatment groups, differently. Public servants in the judiciary are significantly more equitable than in the other professions when it comes to allocating the vouchers. Few other variables are significant: being Catholic or an ex-combatant, as well as being more experienced in the job and having been promoted, is correlated with taking a larger bribe. Exposure to governance trainings and the level of exposure to irregular requests from citizens in the job are associated with more equal behaviors in terms of service delivery.


The robustness of the results was checked using a series of different specifications. In both the bribery taking and service delivery cases (see Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix), we tested the models again gradually adding groups of covariates on personal characteristics; (1) excluding the sessions where the participants only where exposed to one of the three situations (no message, standard message, professional identity message); (2) includ-

ing the participants who seemed to have misunderstood the experiment; (3) replacing missing control variables with sample rather than professional category averages and (4) controlling for those replaced missing variables with a dummy; (5) removing both session clusters and session fixed; (6) removing session fixed effects; and (7) using a Probit model instead of a Logit model or a (8) count (Poisson) model instead of the OLS model. The effect of the professional identity message on vouchers allocation are remarkably consistent across models, while the effect of the standard message is not significant in case (1) and borderline insignificant (at $p < 0.1$) in quite a few instances. The effects on bribe-taking remain largely non-significant, except for the standard message in the case where outliers are included.

5.4 Heterogeneous effects

The results presented in Section 4.1, as well as the literature surveyed earlier suggest heterogeneous effects along the lines of socio-professional and personal characteristics. In line with Transparency International’s East Africa Bribery index and the existing literature, we focus on the socio-professional category. Figure 2 shows clear heterogeneous effects for different professional categories, especially in terms of vouchers allocation.

Figure 2 – Heterogeneous effect by socio-professional category (Logit)



The messages seem effective only in the cases of (1) the police, (2) the court clerks for the professional identity message only, and (3) the nurses, but this time it is the standard message that is effective and the professional identity message is only borderline significant. The messages seem to have no impact whatsoever on the teachers. The results hold when looking at the model in levels (see Table 6 in the Appendix). There is also a slight, and surprising, borderline positive effect of the message on bribe-taking in the case of the nurses in the case of the logit model only. The models include controls for the series of socio-demographic variables described earlier (vector X_{it}), thereby suggesting that the reason of those differences is not in the observed differences presented in Section 5.1.

A myriad of heterogeneous effects can potentially be tested in addition to the professional category. The most important and interesting of these relate to existing research about the profiles that are more prone to corruption and the core interest of this paper: professional identity and experience and exposure to corruption. Looking at basic socio-demographic variables (Figure 3) that have been associated with different attitudes towards corruption (while still controlling for socio-professional categories), the effect of the messages on the unequal allocation of vouchers disappears for participants above 30 and for female participants. Still in terms of service delivery, Catholics and non-Catholics are not reactive to the same message, and people who use the Internet appear less sensitive to either message.


In line with Voors et al (2012) and given the fragile context of Burundi, it is worth looking into the interplay between corruption awareness and the experience of conflict. The latter is, indeed, known to deeply shape identity and the perception of the public service. Figure 4, which again includes controls for socio-professional categories and the variables presented in Section 3.1, shows that the experience of violence matters when looking at the impact of the messages on service delivery. With the exception of the internally displaced persons — who seem particularly sensitive to the standard message —, the less affected by war are the participant, the more likely are they to be sensitive to the messages.

Finally, professional experience also appears to play a role (Figure 5) in terms of service delivery, with the more experienced participants not being sensitive at all to the messages, while those who were promoted and those who never received a promotion react to different messages -respectively the standard and professional identity messages. Similarly, participants who reported being very exposed to irregular or illegal requests from citizens (which can entail corruption), reacted to the professional identity message but not to the standard message, unlike to the rest of their colleagues.

Triple interaction effects, exploring the heterogeneous effects of the messages when looking at a combination of the aforementioned factors, were not tested given the limited size of the sample.


Five key results emerge from the experiment: (1) none of the messages

Figure 3 – Heterogeneous effect by socio-demographic category (Logit)*




* 30 years old is the median.

Figure 4 – Heterogeneous effect by experience of conflict and violence (Logit)*



* **Affected by violence** was built using the question *In the last year, has violence prevented you from having a normal life?* (with answers on a 5-item Likert scale between not at all (0) and a lot (4); *yes* includes all those who responded 2, 3, and 4.

Figure 5 – Heterogeneous effect by professional experience and exposure to corruption (Logit)*



* 5 years of experience corresponds to the third quartile. **vocation** is based on the question *Do you feel that the job you are doing is what you wanted to do, that it is your vocation?*, with answers on a 5-item Likert scale between not at all (0) and a lot (4). **vocation** includes those who responded 3 and 4. **corruption** is based on the question *Does it happen that citizens ask you to do something for them that is not legal or permitted? How often?*, with answers on a 5-item Likert scale between not at all (0) and a lot (4). **very exposed** includes those who responded 3 and 4. **control** is based on the question *How much is the job that you are doing controlled, to check that you are doing it right*, with answers on a 5-item Likert scale between not at all (0) and a lot (4). **controlled** includes those who responded 3 and 4.

influences the propensity to accept a bribe, (2) both messages impact the way public servants allocate vouchers, i.e. public service delivery, with the effect of the message that calls attention to professional identity being more robust; (3) bribery and public service delivery dimensions are not correlated; (4) the type of professional identity, as well socio-demographic characteristics such as age and war experience, matter, in particular, nurses, teachers, court clerks, and police react differently to anti-corruption messages; (5) the efficacy of the professional identity message versus the standard message diverges depending on key personal factors such as exposure to corruption or religion.

6 Discussion

This section discusses the effect of the messages (or lack thereof), first on bribe-taking and then on public service delivery, before commenting on methodological aspects.

6.1 Bribery

The messages did not significantly correlate with bribe-taking. The dominant strategy, i.e. pocketing the whole bribe as no penalty was to be expected, was unaffected by the messages. The qualitative feedback collected after the experiment suggests that the participants did understand that the experiment included a bribery attempt. Therefore, the lack of effectiveness of the messages may be due to the local context or a specific perception of the public administration. The financial situation of public servants in Burundi is worth mentioning here. The high level of bribe-taking may be need-, rather than greed-induced, making it hard for the messages to have any sort of influence. For those whose salaries still are comparatively low, such as teachers and policemen, weak institutions and low salaries may prevent any opportunity to increase household budget. For these participants, the BIF 4,000 extra-money was a non-negligible amount. This explanation is less convincing for the nurses and court clerks, who are better paid. Corrupt behavior for them could be more greed-induced since they cannot resist profiting from a tempting situation no matter the rules, or awareness messages, in spite of having enough to satisfy their basic needs (Ndikumana, 2006).

The perception of ‘good governance’ and ‘being a good public servant’ has to be clarified. Bribe-taking in this experiment was compatible with an equal allocation of vouchers. This option, chosen by the majority of the participants, may be sufficient for them to think of themselves as good enough public servants, especially in a context where social norms are not necessarily identical to those of high-income industrialized countries (de Sardan, 1999). Although messages were carefully composed in Kirundi and tested several

times, it remains possible that some participants saw the message, which reminded them of the social norms associated with their profession, but failed to change her behavior because s/he had a different opinion about what constitutes a public servant's typical behavior. In their study on bankers' social norms in Switzerland, [Cohn et al \(2014\)](#) shed light on the power of professional self-identity, showing that reminding bankers of their profession has a negative impact on their ethical behavior. The business culture of the Burundian public administration is plagued with corruption. Therefore, reminding the participants that a good public servant is equitable and incorruptible might sound as a wishful thinking rather than an efficient professional identity reminder to some of the participants.

The design of the experiment created an unusual environment in which the participants were totally anonymous, and probably felt under little or no scrutiny. This aspect of the design was important to make sure the experiment would take place smoothly in the aforementioned context. Yet, the experimental context is not entirely disconnected from real-life situations in developing countries: citizens with limited social capital often have little bargaining power when attempting to obtain extra illegal services from poorly monitored public servants. That said, scrutiny of public servants is likely to be higher in an office, where well-connected citizens may be in a position to monitor the public servant's behavior.

Finally, given the context and features of the experiment (anonymity, lack of sanction, one-shot), it is remarkable that not all participants took the entirety of the bribe. Interestingly, the level of bribe acceptance is consistent with other experimental bribery games with no sanction and no risk of detection, although those were conducted with student participants ([Frank and Schulze, 2000](#); [Barr and Serra, 2009](#)).

6.2 Public service delivery

The high level of participants who allocated vouchers equally, thereby refusing to deliver the favor asked from the briber, was expected. In line with [Fehr and Schmidt \(1999\)](#), we observe that most people behave equitably when no cost is implied. In our experiment, the lack of automatic reciprocity made it financially and morally costless for the public servant to be equitable. The one-shot nature of the experiment could also have contributed to this high figure. As shown by [Abbink et al \(2002\)](#), repeating a bribery game with the same participants, and increasing the level of personal interaction with the briber, contributes to increased reciprocity.

Our anti-corruption messages were negatively and significantly correlated with an unequal allocation of vouchers. Public servant participants who were reminded of the importance of good governance or of the qualities expected from their profession allocated vouchers more equally amongst citizens. Our main hypothesis is that both the standard and professional

identity reminders increased the salience of moral costs. When reminded of the social value of integrity (standard message) or the values of the public servant (professional identity message), bowing to the demand of the briber became more difficult for the bribe-taker.

Petty corruption experiments involving negative externalities, contextual framing or intermediaries have already shown that moral costs are an important determinant in bribery decision-making (Barr and Serra, 2009; Drugov et al, 2013; Di Falco et al, 2016). Notably, Barr and Serra (2009) found that negative externalities combined with a corruption framing scenario are associated with lower bribe-acceptance. In our experiment, the standard message is a soft reminder of the social cost associated with favor delivery to the briber. If people behaving unethically typically try to disconnect their bad behavior from their social consequences, effectiveness of the standard message may owe to the possibility it offers to look away from such consequences.

The mechanism behind the effectiveness of the professional identity message is slightly different. The stress is on the damage to the public servant self-image and the professional identity message seeks to make this personal cost salient to the participant. A possible strategy for an agent to cope with infringing social norms may be to disconnect her action from the image she has of herself. Drugov et al (2013) showed that the use of intermediaries acting as facilitators in a corrupt transaction increased the level of corruption by lowering the moral costs of both citizens and public officials. Similarly, Di Falco et al (2016) suggested that low number of intermediaries in a transfer chain increased moral costs and feeling of shame when transparency allows to infer embezzled amounts. In the present case, it is the professional identity message that seems to increase moral costs for the public servants.

Both messages have a negative effect on inequality, with the professional identity message having a more consistent and robust effect than the standard message. However, the content of the message does matter. Although we do not have sufficient grounds to fully explain why some categories of public servants are more sensitive to one message, it is likely associated with identity construction, related values and norms and experience (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Some professional categories seemed more sensitive to any anti-corruption message than others. The differences between professional groups are not fully explained by the different socio-demographic characteristics. Part of the explanation may also lie in a different ethos and relationship to professional identity and social values, in line with the study of Cohn et al (2014). Equality may be more central to the profession of a policeman or court clerk –who tend to be more equal in voucher allocation, regardless of exposure to anti-corruption messages– than to a nurse or teacher, who may tolerate that some patients or students deserve more attention. However, it remains puzzling that one category of public servants, the teachers, are totally insensitive to the messages. The finding that experienced public ser-

vants (5 years and above) are not receptive to any of the message suggests that tolerance of inequality in public service delivery develops over time. This corroborates the findings of [Barr et al \(2009\)](#) that a ‘culture’ of corruption is gradually internalized in Ethiopian nurse careers. Besides, when controlling for work experience, the younger generation (below 30) that witnessed deep governance crises with the civil war between 1993 and 2007, is insensitive to the messages. This points out to the fact that attitude towards public service delivery is also generational. The personal experience of governance and conflict may explain why victims of war were generally insensitive to either message. This behavior seem in contradiction with the findings of [Voors et al \(2012\)](#), who found that victims of war in Burundi tend to be more altruistic. However, these behaviors are compatible if the priority of an individual is her sheer survival.

The experimental design intentionally disentangles two aspects of corruption: the bribe-taking and the social costs related to the delivery of a rationed public service. Our results show that, in a context where there is no automatic link from bribe-taking to service delivery, participants clearly separate these two aspects.

6.3 Methodological observations and prospects

Our messages were embedded inside a booklet that included basic information about the experiment (timing, practical information, etc.). We deliberately chose not to scare our participants with aggressive anti-corruption reminders. As such, our good governance or professional identity reminders were subtler than a standalone message. It is likely that stronger impact from the messages would be expected, were they displayed on a different support or made more visible to its recipient. In their UK-based field experiment, [Hallsworth et al \(2017\)](#) showed that short messages directly targeting the taxpayer dramatically increased tax payment through increasing moral costs. Besides, the authors underline the cost-effectiveness of using this preventive strategy. They claim they were able to collect more than £3 million in 23 days and stress that the marginal cost for the policy-maker was close to 0. Similarly, using short messages as reminders to prevent corrupt behavior or improve public service delivery would be a highly valuable and low cost strategy.

The issue of participants’ self-selection is typical in experimental economics, and it also applies to the present study. Participants voluntarily enrolled into the study, and may be more interested in financial gain than their colleagues who chose not to come. Similarly to students participating in a lab on-campus experiment, they may thus not exactly represent the general population of interest ([Charness et al, 2013](#)). This problem is however mitigated by the fact that participants in the experiment coincide exactly with the population of interest: actual public servants of the four key cat-

egories of East African public sector. The high level of bribe-taking in our experiment is similar to other lab experiments, which were all conducted with students. However, our results differ from the low-level of corruption public servants [Alatas et al \(2009\)](#) found in their experiment in Indonesia. Apart from the cultural difference between our participants and theirs, different levels of scrutiny (especially anonymity and experiment venue) and the difference in experiment design could explain, at least in part, the divergence in the results. The external validity of this experiment on corruption is limited by the perception of the public service in different countries, even within the African Great Lakes region, and replicating the experiment in neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania and DR Congo would certainly be interesting. In the same vein, it would be important to confront our results with out-of-the-lab impact evaluations. Although lab-in-the-field experiment sometimes brings results similar to field experiments, it is not always necessary the case ([Olken, 2007](#); [Serra, 2011](#); [Armantier and Boly, 2013](#)). Our results need to be exploited carefully, keeping in mind the context of Bujumbura in December 2013 and January 2014. They are, however, useful to understand the rationale of public servants facing bribery in the fragile, low-income, Central African context of Burundi.

7 Conclusion

Our lab-in-the-field experiment directly observes public servants behavior when confronted with a bribery temptation. The results help to understand the channels of corruption mechanisms, and to estimate the policy leverage of messages about good governance and professional identity reminders. Reminding public servants of the moral values of honesty and equality associated with the public service may lead them to make a fairer choice towards citizen's participants, but not necessarily to take fewer bribes. The professional identity reminder appeared as generally more robust than the more general good governance message. Overall, the results suggest that professional identity or the values associated with it can increase ethical behavior and, that, even in post-conflict societies where the public service is generally perceived as corrupt, inequitable, and inefficient.

In addition to confirming the relevance of the self-perception of professional image when dealing with corruption in the public service, the present article also sheds light on the need to study different aspects of corruption mechanisms. In particular, personal financial gain and concern with equality in public service delivery are not influenced by the same factors and are not even correlated.

The policy implications of this paper depend on the external validity of the experiment, both beyond the lab and beyond the Burundi context. Donors and governments spend important amounts of money to improve the

governance of fragile states. Corrupt administrations and bribery are described as a major impediment to the stability and development of countries like Burundi, and recent violence in Bujumbura have shown that the topic matters for Burundian citizens. In this context, it is necessary to formulate some policy recommendations. A sensible lesson from the experiment is that sensitization campaign can work, but need to play on the right incentives and values. It is important for policy-makers to make decisions about the objectives of such sensitization campaigns; as our experiment shows that awareness messages may lead to a delivery of services that is more beneficial to the community, but do not reduce bribe-taking. Anti-corruption campaigns based on identity need yet to be tested in non-lab context, but our study goes already a long way to confirm that although results are inconclusive on bribe-taking, this non-expensive approach impacts on public service delivery. This relatively inexpensive strategy could present higher short-run cost-effectiveness than a wide, but often unenforced anti-corruption legal arsenal.

Appendices

A Additional tables

Table 6 – Socio-demographic indicators by intervention group, including difference relative to the control group

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | |
|--|----------------|------|----------------------|------|----------------------------|------|
| | no msg mean | sd | standard msg mean | sd | prof. identity msg mean | sd |
| Gender (female) ^d | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.34* | 0.48 |
| Age (in years) | 30.04 | 5.50 | 29.40 | 5.18 | 30.07 | 6.13 |
| Education: primary only ^d | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.17 | 0.38 |
| post-secondary ^d | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.69 | 0.46 | 0.60 | 0.49 |
| Catholic ^{d1} | 0.73 | 0.45 | 0.60* | 0.49 | 0.66 | 0.47 |
| Member of association ² | 0.76 | 0.43 | 0.80 | 0.40 | 0.74 | 0.44 |
| Internally Displaced ^{d3} | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.24 | 0.43 |
| Returnee ^{d4} | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0.14 | 0.35 |
| Exp. of violence ⁵ | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.17 | 0.37 |
| Ex-combatant ^{d6} | 1.91 | 1.51 | 1.69 | 1.44 | 2.20 | 1.49 |
| Fish/meat per week ^{d7} | 0.17 | 0.46 | 0.14 | 0.43 | 0.16 | 0.42 |
| Owns motorbike/card ^d | 0.97 | 1.13 | 1.13 | 1.30 | 0.99 | 1.12 |
| Never accessed internet ^d | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.44 | 0.50 |
| Use internet monthly at least ^d | 0.29 | 0.46 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0.22 | 0.41 |
| Level of trust ⁸ | 1.84 | 0.97 | 1.72 | 0.90 | 1.61* | 0.97 |
| Health sector ^d | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0.24 | 0.43 |
| Education ^d | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0.25 | 0.44 |
| Justice sector (clerks) ^d | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0.26 | 0.44 |
| Police ^d | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0.25 | 0.44 |
| Observations | 172 | | 173 | | 182 | |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummy variable. 1-7, see legend of table 1 for details.

Table 7 – Characteristics associated with bribe-taking

| | (1) bribe-taking OLS | (2) bribe-taking Logit | (3) bribe-taking Logit (no FE) |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Standard message | 312.1* (169.5) | 0.440 (0.414) | 0.215 (0.401) |
| Professional Identity message | 50.79 (214.4) | 0.117 (0.521) | -0.0753 (0.476) |
| Sector | | | |
| Education sector ^{d1} | -1507.3*** (249.1) | -14.38*** (-1.255) | 1.760*** (0.652) |
| Justice sector (clerks) ^{d1} | -1236.3*** (128.6) | -2.250*** (0.370) | 0.673 (0.522) |
| Police ^{d1} | 252.4 (379.3) | 12.10*** (-1.615) | 0.339 (0.473) |
| Personal characteristics | | | |
| Gender (female) ^d | 54.14 (144.9) | 0.347 (0.473) | 0.303 (0.398) |
| Age (in years) | -24.13* (12.19) | -0.0402 (0.0288) | -0.0405 (0.0269) |
| Level of education ² | -56.45 (57.42) | -0.108 (0.167) | -0.0510 (0.145) |
| Catholic ^{d3} | 342.0** (145.4) | 0.666* (0.381) | 0.566* (0.304) |
| Member of association ³ | -198.7 (149.7) | -0.447 (0.396) | -0.334 (0.366) |
| Internally Displaced ^{d3} | -38.41 (224.4) | -0.346 (0.474) | -0.388 (0.451) |
| Returnee ^{d3} | -114.9 (271.4) | -0.190 (0.570) | -0.287 (0.575) |
| Ex-combatant ^{d3} | 354.6* (198.9) | 1.136* (0.622) | 1.039 (0.661) |
| Exp. of violence ³ | 54.12 (36.12) | 0.126 (0.0984) | 0.108 (0.0926) |
| Wealth ⁴ | 661.6 (696.8) | 0.737 (-1.745) | 1.090 (-1.684) |
| Never accessed internet ^d | 20.97 (110.0) | -0.0495 (0.256) | -0.155 (0.224) |
| Level of trust ³ | 26.38 (88.95) | 0.00412 (0.192) | -0.0128 (0.184) |
| Work experience | | | |
| Work experience (years) | 42.94** (14.99) | 0.0698* (0.0395) | 0.0572 (0.0422) |
| Ever promoted ^d | 311.8* (151.6) | 1.277** (0.517) | 1.232** (0.498) |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummy variable. 1: the professional reference category is nurses (health sector).

2: with (0) no education, (1) primary, (2) lower secondary, (3) upper secondary, and (4) tertiary

3: defined in the same way as in table 1. 4: Wealth is a mean index made of the z-scores of the following indicators: weekly consumption of fish or meat, ownership of a mobile phone, car, TV set, and radio, all weighted by the size of the household. 5: Defined in the same way as in table 3.

6: Defined in the same way as in table 4.

Table 7 – Characteristics associated with bribe-taking (continued)

| | (1) bribe-taking OLS | (2) bribe-taking Logit | (3) bribe-taking Logit (no FE) |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Ever had salary increase ^d | -99.62 (167.5) | -0.0673 (0.467) | -0.0881 (0.445) |
| Satisfaction with job ⁵ | 21.84 (67.02) | 0.0588 (0.172) | -0.00334 (0.163) |
| Job as a vocation ⁵ | -80.00 (58.12) | -0.194 (0.192) | -0.175 (0.191) |
| Also has another professional activity ^d | -236.5 (185.4) | -0.560 (0.408) | -0.593 (0.402) |
| Exposure to corruption | | | |
| Ever attended governance training ^{d6} | 45.28 (72.98) | -0.0202 (0.152) | 0.0250 (0.146) |
| Exposure to irregularities ⁶ | 77.36 (127.7) | 0.0612 (0.235) | 0.0214 (0.213) |
| Controlled work ⁶ | -47.94 (52.41) | -0.196 (0.121) | -0.178 (0.135) |
| Other behavior in experiment | | | |
| Vouchers allocation (inequality level) | 20.05 (27.13) | | |
| Vouchers allocation ^b (1=unequal) | | 0.304 (0.522) | 0.281 (0.524) |
| Constant | 4526.1*** (696.8) | 2.817* -1.566 | 3.136** -1.294 |
| Session fixed effects | YES | YES | NO |
| N | 492 | 492 | 492 |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummy variable. 1: the professional reference category is nurses (health sector).

2: with (0) no education, (1) primary, (2) lower secondary, (3) upper secondary, and (4) tertiary

3: defined in the same way as in table 1. 4: Wealth is a mean index made of the z-scores of the following indicators: weekly consumption of fish or meat, ownership of a mobile phone, car, TV set, and radio, all weighted by the size of the household. 5: Defined in the same way as in table 3.

6: Defined in the same way as in table 4.

Table 8 – Characteristics associated with voucher allocation

| | (1) inequality OLS | (2) inequality Logit | (3) inequality Logit (no FE) |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Standard message | -0.437 (0.323) | -0.573** (0.292) | -0.510* (0.288) |
| Professional Identity message | -0.519*** (0.160) | -0.468** (0.230) | -0.463** (0.230) |
| Sector | | | |
| Education sector ^{d1} | -0.488 (0.418) | 12.87*** -1.097 | -0.542 (0.359) |
| Justice sector (clerks) ^{d1} | -1.194*** (0.163) | -0.919*** (0.188) | -1.155*** (0.282) |
| Police ^{d1} | -0.856 (0.635) | -13.44*** -1.566 | 0.0885 (0.475) |
| Personal characteristics | | | |
| Gender (female) ^d | -0.0867 (0.181) | -0.174 (0.226) | -0.251 (0.212) |
| Age (in years) | -0.00750 (0.0213) | -0.0139 (0.0259) | -0.0162 (0.0232) |
| Level of education ² | 0.164 (0.152) | 0.237 (0.163) | 0.223 (0.157) |
| Catholic ^{d3} | -0.135 (0.238) | -0.181 (0.318) | -0.170 (0.283) |
| Member of association ³ | 0.0363 (0.208) | -0.136 (0.236) | -0.155 (0.232) |
| Internally Displaced ^{d3} | 0.0592 (0.257) | -0.0834 (0.329) | -0.0814 (0.322) |
| Returnee ^{d3} | -0.199 (0.199) | -0.0566 (0.249) | 0.0142 (0.236) |
| Ex-combatant ^{d3} | 0.762** (0.276) | 0.420 (0.327) | 0.362 (0.360) |
| Exp. of violence ³ | -0.0532 (0.0635) | -0.0529 (0.0938) | -0.0504 (0.0895) |
| Wealth ⁴ | 0.0136 (0.990) | -0.609 -1.194 | -0.433 -1.091 |
| Level of trust ³ | -0.163 (0.109) | -0.278 (0.173) | -0.289* (0.175) |
| Work experience | | | |
| Work experience (years) | -0.00547 (0.0255) | 0.00563 (0.0290) | 0.0102 (0.0216) |
| Ever promoted ^d | 0.190 (0.166) | 0.241 (0.302) | 0.210 (0.282) |
| Ever had salary increase ^d | -0.291 | -0.216 | -0.173 |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummy variable. 1: the professional reference category is nurses (health sector).

2: with (0) no education, (1) primary, (2) lower secondary, (3) upper secondary, and (4) tertiary

3: defined in the same way as in table 1. 4: Wealth is a mean index made of the z-scores of the following indicators: weekly consumption of fish or meat, ownership of a mobile phone, car, TV set, and radio, all weighted by the size of the household. 5: Defined in the same way as in table 3.

6: Defined in the same way as in table 4.

Table 8 – Characteristics associated with voucher allocation (continued)

| | (1) inequality OLS | (2) inequality Logit | (3) inequality Logit (no FE) |
|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Satisfaction with job ⁵ | (0.213) 0.194 (0.114) | (0.295) 0.279 (0.175) | (0.274) 0.235 (0.163) |
| Job as a vocation ⁵ | -0.0391 (0.0960) | -0.0901 (0.107) | -0.0911 (0.112) |
| Also has another professional activity ^d | 0.0569 (0.187) | -0.193 (0.231) | -0.131 (0.212) |
| Exposure to corruption Ever attended governance training ^{d6} | 0.0459 (0.0804) | 0.218** (0.0972) | 0.155* (0.0927) |
| Exposure to irregularities ⁶ | -0.303 (0.260) | -0.719** (0.326) | -0.700** (0.332) |
| Controlled work ⁶ | -0.0183 (0.104) | -0.0247 (0.121) | 0.000122 (0.125) |
| Other behavior in experiment Level of bribery-take (in BIF 1,000) | 0.0000642 (0.0000754) | | |
| Took the bribe (1=unequal) | | 0.274 (0.597) | 0.228 (0.579) |
| Constant | 1.770 -1.214 | -0.778 -1.432 | -0.416 -1.389 |
| Session fixed effects | YES | YES | NO |
| N | 492 | 492 | 492 |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

d: dummy variable. 1: the professional reference category is nurses (health sector).

2: with (0) no education, (1) primary, (2) lower secondary, (3) upper secondary, and (4) tertiary

3: defined in the same way as in table 1. 4: Wealth is a mean index made of the z-scores of the following indicators: weekly consumption of fish or meat, ownership of a mobile phone, car, TV set, and radio, all weighted by the size of the household. 5: Defined in the same way as in table 3.

6: Defined in the same way as in table 4.

Table 9 – Robustness checks: effects on bribe-taking

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Probit | Poisson |
| Standard message | 0.213 (0.527) | 0.563** (0.266) | 0.435 (0.410) | 0.546 (0.436) | 0.221 (0.384) | 0.221 (0.405) | 0.230 (0.195) | 0.0936* (0.0497) |
| Professional Identity message | 0.285 (0.607) | 0.351 (0.453) | 0.119 (0.514) | 0.217 (0.546) | -0.0762 (0.366) | -0.0762 (0.484) | 0.0739 (0.265) | 0.0151 (0.0623) |
| Unfair allocation of vouchers (dummy) | 0.467 (0.600) | -0.0527 (0.378) | 0.309 (0.526) | 0.323 (0.516) | 0.276 (0.379) | 0.276 (0.523) | 0.140 (0.258) | |
| Unfair allocation of vouchers (level) | | | | | | | | 0.00602 |
| Unfair allocation of vouchers (dummy) | | | | | | | | (0.00810) |
| Constant | 3.401* -1.941 | 1.116 (0.947) | 2.781* -1.569 | 2.530* -1.458 | 3.183** -1.597 | 3.183** -1.287 | 1.345 (0.829) | 8.126*** (0.240) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Session fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Session clusters | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES |
| N | 388 | 527 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 10 – Robustness checks: effects on voucher allocation

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Probit | Poisson |
| Standard message | -0.474 (0.361) | -0.570* (0.293) | -0.623* (0.321) | -0.509* (0.295) | -0.509* (0.286) | -0.322* (0.173) | -0.497* (0.272) | -0.474 (0.361) |
| Professional Identity message | -0.553** | -0.460** | -0.509** | -0.468* | -0.468** | -0.271** | -0.479*** | -0.553** |
| Unfair allocation of vouchers (dummy) | (0.242) | (0.228) | (0.233) | (0.275) | (0.229) | (0.132) | (0.142) | (0.242) |
| Unfair allocation of vouchers (level) | 0.513 | 0.275 | 0.299 | 0.225 | 0.225 | 0.168 | | 0.513 |
| Unfair allocation of vouchers (dummy) | (0.617) | (0.599) | (0.589) | (0.382) | (0.578) | (0.335) | 0.0000664 | (0.617) |
| Constant | 0.603 | -0.751 | -0.769 | -0.435 | -0.435 | -0.484 | 0.292 | 0.603 |
| Controls | -1.636 | -1.439 | -1.415 | -1.212 | -1.379 | (0.802) | -1.178 | -1.636 |
| Session fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Session clusters | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| N | 388 | 527 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 |

Stars: statistical difference between this category and all the other categories combined.

T-test significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

B Post-experiment questionnaire (French version)

| Enquête: Services publics et population 2013 | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------|--------|--|
| Identifiant du participant: / / / / / / / / * Date: / / / / / / / /1/3/ | | | | | | | |
| n | Questions | | | | | | |
| 101 | Quel est votre sexe ? | Homme 1 | | Femme 2 | | 1 | |
| 102 | Quel âge avez-vous ? | âge / / / | | | | 1 | |
| 103 | Es-ce vous le chef de ménage ? | Oui 1 | | Non 0 | | 1 | |
| 104 | Quelle langue parlez-vous à la maison ? | Kirundi 1 | Français 2 | Swahili 3 | | C | |
| 105 | Quel est votre niveau d'instruction | Aucune 0 | alphabétisation 1 primaire 2 secondaire inférieure 3 | secondaire (A3) 4 secondaire (A2) 5 supérieur 6 | 1 | | |
| 106 | De combien de personnes se compose votre ménage ? | / / / | | | | C | |
| 107 | Combien de personnes de votre ménage ramènent de l'argent à la maison ? | / / / | | | | C | |
| 108 | Tous les enfants en âge d'aller à l'école vont-ils à l'école ? | Oui 1 | | Non 0 | | 1 | |
| 109 | Etes-vous membre d'une organisation culturelle ou sportive, religieuse, ou d'un groupe d'entraide ? | Association religieuse 1 Association culturelle ou sportive 2 Groupe d'entraide 3 | | | | 1 | |
| 110 | Si oui, à quelle fréquence participez-vous à des activités avec cette ou ces organisations ? | Une fois par semaine ou plus 1 Environ deux ou trois fois par mois 2 | | Quelques fois par an 3 Une fois par an ou moins 4 | | | |
| 111 | Etes-vous une personne déplacée ? | | | Oui 1 | Non 0 | 1 | |
| 112 | Etes-vous une personne rapatriée ? | | | Oui 1 | Non 0 | 1 | |
| 113 | Etes-vous une personne indigente ? | | | Oui 1 | Non 0 | 1 | |
| 114 | Faites-vous parti des ex-combattants ? | | | Oui 1 | Non 0 | 1 | |
| 115 | Cette dernière année, la violence a-t-elle empêché votre famille de mener une existence normale ? | Très fortement 1 | Fortement 2 | Oui, un peu 3 | Non, pas trop 4 | Non 5 | |
| 116 | Fréquentez-vous un lieu de culte ou une figure religieuse? Si oui, lequel / lesquels ? | Aucune 0 | Eglise - Chrétien - catholique 1 Temple - Chrétien - protestant 2 Temple - Chrétien - autre adventiste, Jéovah etc. 3 | Mosquée - Musulman 4 Magie/esprits - Animiste 5 Autre (expliquer.....) 6 | 1 | | |
| 117 | Disposez-vous d'un téléphone portable dans votre foyer ? | Nombre / / / | | | | C | |
| 118 | Disposez-vous d'une télévision dans votre foyer ? | Nombre / / / | | | | C | |
| 119 | Disposez-vous d'une radio dans votre foyer ? | Nombre / / / | | | | C | |
| 120 | Disposez-vous d'une voiture ou moto dans votre foyer ? | Nombre / / / | | | | C | |
| 121 | Etes-vous locataire ou propriétaire ? | Locataire 1 | | Propriétaire 2 | | 1 | |
| 122 | Combien de fois utilisez-vous internet, par mois ? | Jamais 1 fois 2 fois | | 3 fois 4 ou plus | | 1 | |
| 123 | Dans votre foyer, combien de fois par semaine mangez-vous du poisson ou de la viande ? | / / / | | | | C | |
| 124 | Auriez-vous un emprunt/une dette important(e) que vous devez rembourser ? | | | Oui 1 | Non 2 | | |
| 125 | Si oui, pouvez-vous nous dire à combien s'élever cet emprunt/ cette dette ? | FBU | | | | | |
| 126 | Ces deux dernières années, avez-vous du faire face à un problème urgent et imprévu, tellement important que vous avez dû vendre un bien ou emprunter de l'argent en urgence ? | Non 0 | Oui, lié à la santé 1 | Oui, liée à l'éducation 2 Oui, liée à des obligations sociales (dot, mariage, deuil, etc.) 3 | | M | |
| 127 | De manière générale, comment décrivez-vous la situation économique actuelle du pays ? | Excellente 1 | Très bonne, presque pas de problèmes 2 | Moyenne, quelque soucis 3 | Pas bonne, beaucoup de soucis 4 | 1 5 | |
| 128 | Et vos propres conditions de vie actuelles ? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 5 | |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 129 | Et vos conditions de vie par rapport à celles des autres Burundais ? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|-----|--|---|---|---|---|---|

Concernant votre travail

| | | | | | |
|-----|---|---|--|---------------|---------------|
| 200 | Combien de temps venez-vous de passer dans votre emploi actuel? | | | | ... / Année |
| 201 | Durant tout ce temps, avez-vous eu une promotion dans votre travail, une fois ou plusieurs fois ? | | | | Oui 1 / Non 0 |
| 202 | Durant tout ce temps également, avez-vous eu une augmentation de salaire ? | | | | Oui 1 / Non 0 |
| 203 | Etes-vous satisfait, content du travail que vous faites ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 204 | Est-ce que ce que vous devez faire est-il clair? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 205 | Est-ce que le travail que vous faites correspond-t-il à vos études ? à votre formation ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 206 | Le travail que vous faites, ressentez-vous vraiment que c'est ce que vous aviez voulu et que vous êtes appelés à faire ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 207 | Vous sentez-vous respecté dans votre travail ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 208 | Si vous regardez les salaires qui sont donnés au Burundi, trouvez-vous que votre salaire est satisfaisant ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 209 | Dans votre travail, trouvez-vous que ceux qui viennent à vous et la population en général vous respectent ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 210 | Vos responsables hiérarchiques, trouvez-vous qu'ils vous respectent ? | Oui beaucoup 1 Oui 2 | un peu 3 Non pas vraiment 4 | Pas du tout 5 | |
| 211 | Y'a-t-il des formations de renforcement des capacités que vous avez reçu à votre travail ? | | | | Oui / Non |
| 212 | Si c'est Oui, les formations ont porté sur quoi? | la technique 1 l'administration et le social 2 | les relations avec les bénéficiaires 3 Autres.....4 | | |
| 213 | Quand est-ce que vous avez reçu une information (affiche, spot radio, formation, etc.) sur le comportement des fonctionnaires pour la dernière fois ? | Aujourd'hui même 1 Il y a une semaine ou moins 2 | Ce mois 3 Durant cette année 4 Plus que une année ou jamais 5 | | |
| 214 | De quoi est-ce que cela parlait ? | la technique 1 l'administration et le social 2 | les relations avec les bénéficiaires 3 Bonne gouvernance /intégrité 4 Autres.....5 | | |
| 215 | Avez-vous un deuxième emploi ? Si oui, lequel ? | Commerce 1 Moto-taxi, taxi 2 | Taxi-vélo 3 Service (coiffeur, cabaret, etc.) 4 | | |

Les tâches indispensables

| | | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|---|
| 301 | Pouvez-vous nous dire dans l'ordre d'importance trois choses qui donnent de la valeur à votre travail ? | Le travail est rapide ... Le travail se fait dans la transparence ... Pas de discrimination ... | Des travailleurs compétents.... Des outils adaptés et performants Des prix compétitifs ... | 0 |
| 302 | Dans le cas où l'Etat ne peut pas satisfaire à toutes les demandes de la population, quelles sont les populations qu'il met en avant ? | Les pauvres 1 Les plus nécessiteux 2 | Ceux qui peuvent payer le service 3 Ceux qui le gagnent dans la compétition 4 | |
| 303 | Là où nous vivons, qui pensez-vous devrait donner l'exemple aux autres ? | Les élus par la population 1 Les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Etat 2 | Les fonctionnaires de l'Etat 3 La population 4 | |

| | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|
| 304 | Pouvez-vous nous dire dans l'ordre d'importance les trois problèmes principaux que vous voyez dans le pays ? Dans l'ordre d'importance | Le manque d'infrastructures Des infrastructures belles et solides... Le manque de personnel..... | La bonne gouvernance (la corruption) ... La violence/criminalité ... Le manque de leader, de vision ... Les divisions ethniques ... |
| 305 | Trouvez-vous que ce que vous faites satisfait la population? | Beaucoup de fois 1 Souvent 2 | De temps en temps 3 Rarement 4 Aucune fois 5 |
| 306 | Y'a-t-il des fois où la population vous demande un service qui n'est pas permis par la loi ou par les règles de votre service ? | Beaucoup de fois 1 Souvent 2 | De temps en temps 3 Rarement 4 Aucune fois 5 |
| 307 | Est-ce que le travail que vous faites est-il contrôlé ? Pour voir si vous le faites bien ? | Beaucoup de fois 1 Souvent 2 | De temps en temps 3 Rarement 4 Aucune fois 5 |

| | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|
| | Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion. Choisissez Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. | | M |
| 309 | Affirmation 1: Il est plus important d'avoir un gouvernement qui est efficace, même si le peuple n'a aucune influence sur ce que fait le gouvernement | Affirmation 2: Il est plus important pour les citoyens de pouvoir tenir le gouvernement pour responsable, même si cela implique une prise de décision plus lente | 1 |
| 310 | Affirmation 1: Les médias devraient constamment enquêter et publier sur la corruption et les erreurs du Gouvernement | Affirmation 2: Trop de publications sur les événements négatifs comme la corruption et les erreurs du Gouvernement sont nuisibles au pays | 1 |
| 311 | Selon vous, qui dans ce pays montre l'exemple en termes de bonne gouvernance ? | Président de la République et les fonctionnaires de la Présidence 1 Les députés à l'Assemblée Nationale 2 Les membres du Gouvernement 3 Les conseillers communaux 4 | La police 5 Les agents des impôts, tels que les agents de la Direction Générale des Impôts ou les collecteurs d'impôts locaux 6 Les juges et magistrats 7 Les églises 8 M |
| 312 | Quels sont dans l'ordre d'importance les 3 organes qui rendent service à la population sans discrimination ? | La Police.... La Justice..... La santé ... L'éducation.... | Les services de la Présidence..... Les services fonciers... |
| 313 | En général, pensez-vous que l'on puisse faire confiance aux gens ? | Beaucoup de fois 1 Souvent 2 | De temps en temps 3 Rarement 4 Aucune fois 5 |
| 314 | Ou bien est-ce qu'on est jamais trop prudent avec les gens ? | Beaucoup de fois 1 Souvent 2 | De temps en temps 3 Rarement 4 Aucune fois 5 |
| 315 | Avez-vous bien lu le document qui vous a été présenté au début de l'expérience ? | Oui 1 | Non 0 |

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