Using Cost Observation to Regulate Bureaucratic Firms*

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Abstract. We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied: cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the optimal contract. In all cases, the output level increases with the bureaucratic bias. We find that the optimal contract is linear in cost (fixed payment plus partial cost-reimbursement). A stronger preference for high output reduces the tendency of the firm to announce a high cost (adverse selection), allowing a more powered incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the costs is reimbursed), which alleviates the problem of moral hazard.

Keywords: Procurement, Regulation, Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Bureaucracy.

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1 Introduction

Regulation of a firm under asymmetric cost information has been the subject of intensive research since the pioneering papers of Baron and Myerson (1982), Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont and Tirole (1986). In this literature, it is assumed that the managers of the firms maximize profit net of the disutility of effort. This is a restrictive assumption, since managers are known to be interested not only in monetary rewards but also in managing a large firm. Such preference may reflect the concern of the managers with their reputation and career.

In fact, large firms tend to develop bureaucratic management structures which lead to systematic deviations from profit-maximizing behavior (Monsen and Downs, 1965). One of these deviations is a bias toward revenue maximization. This was found by Amihud and Kamin (1979), who gave empirical support to Baumol’s (1958, 1959) hypothesis of revenue maximization as the objective of large firms (see also Maris (1963) and the references therein). A reason behind this bias may be the observed relation between past revenue and current managerial compensation (McGuire, Chiu and Elbing, 1962).

These issues seem to be even more important in public firms, which are characterized by weak external control on efficiency and weak internal incentives (Mueller, 2003). To describe the behavior of bureaucrats in the public administration, Niskanen (1971) put forward the hypothesis of budget maximization. He remarked that the goals of the bureaucrat are “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease in managing the bureau” (Niskanen, 1971).

The possibility of bureaucratic behavior should thus be taken into account when designing a financing system. In this paper, we study procurement contracts between the government and a bureaucratic firm, and examine whether a preference for higher output changes the results previously obtained in the literature.

In the theory of regulation and procurement, it is usually assumed that the firm (agent) is better informed about its cost function than the regulator (principal). This is common to the contributions of Baron and Myerson (1982), Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont

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1Recent empirical evidence of deviations from profit-maximization was provided by Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2008), who studied the response of corporations to the 2003 dividend tax cut in the USA.

2For a discussion on the motivation of bureaucrats in a public organization, see Wilson (1989, chap. 9).
and Tirole (1986, 1993), which were important milestones.

Baron and Myerson (1982) studied the case in which the realized cost is unobservable. The gross payment to the firm could only be a function of the cost function announced by the firm (prospective payment). In this context, the firm tended to announce a high marginal cost, in order to receive a high payment while incurring in a low cost. The procurement contract should provide incentives for the firm to announce its true marginal cost (rewarding the firm for announcing a low marginal cost). In the setup of Baron and Besanko (1984), the regulator could, ex post, pay an auditing cost to observe (imperfectly) the firm’s realized cost. The optimal scheme is to audit the firm when the reported cost is above a particular level and impose a penalty when the observed cost is low.

To this context of regulation under adverse selection, Laffont and Tirole (1986) add the problem of moral hazard. While in the models of Baron and Myerson (1982) and Baron and Besanko (1984) the firm’s single decision variable is the announcement of its unobservable marginal cost (adverse selection), in the model of Laffont and Tirole (1986), the firm’s unobservable level of cost-reducing effort is also a decision variable (moral hazard). In this case, the planner cannot penalize low observed costs because the firm would simply reduce its effort to increase cost. The optimal contract is shown to be linear in observed cost, being composed by a fixed payment plus a partial cost reimbursement. Firms with lower marginal cost produce higher output, and make more effort. To induce this greater effort on the part of more efficient firms, the fraction of realized cost that the government reimburses to the firm is decreasing with the firm’s efficiency. The net payment that the firm receives is also increasing with efficiency, more than compensating for the higher disutility of effort that is demanded. This is necessary for the firm to announce its efficiency truthfully.3

Technically, we extend the model of Laffont and Tirole (1986) to allow the manager of the firm to have a preference for higher output, deriving utility from the difference between the output level of the firm and a reference output level. In this setup, we study three different kinds of contracts: a cost reimbursement system, which consists of compensating the firm for the costs in which it incurs, a prospective payment system, which grants a

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3Laffont and Tirole (1986) compare their setting with the case in which the regulator is unable to observe cost (as in Baron and Myerson, 1982). If the cost is unobservable, the optimal regulatory policy is a gross transfer that depends on the firm’s announced marginal cost (prospective payment) in such a way that the firm has no incentive to misrepresent its costs. The prospective payment implies no effort distortion for a given output level, contrary to the optimal incentive contract with cost observability, in which the effort is lower than optimal.
fixed financing, independently of the costs that the firm comes to incur, and the optimal incentive scheme, which is found to remain linear in observed cost (in spite of the preference for higher output).

We find that, in all cases, the output level is increasing with the strength of the preference for higher output. Since the cost savings associated with the effort are proportional to the output, the effort level is increasing with the output level, and, therefore, with the bureaucratic bias (except in the context of the cost reimbursement system, in which cost-reducing efforts are not available). The optimal contract remains linear in cost, but depends on the strength of the preference of the firm for higher output. A stronger preference for high output reduces the tendency of the firm to announce a high cost (adverse selection), allowing a more powered incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the costs is reimbursed), which, in turn, alleviates the problem of moral hazard. In all the cases under study, the expected social welfare increases (decreases) with the bureaucratic bias whenever the expected output is larger (lower) than the reference output level.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 analyzes the benchmark case of complete information. In sections 4, 5 and 6, we derive the different procurement contracts: optimal incentive scheme, cost reimbursement and prospective payment, respectively. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.

2 The model

We consider a model of procurement in which the government (principal) offers a contract to a firm (agent) for the provision of a public good.

The firm produces an observable level of output, \( q \in [0, \bar{q}] \), incurring in a constant marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} - e \), which depends on the intrinsic marginal cost of the firm, \( \hat{\beta} \in [\beta, \overline{\beta}] \), and on a cost-reducing effort level, \( e \geq 0 \). The intrinsic marginal cost, drawn from a uniform distribution, is firm’s private information (adverse selection). The level of effort, chosen by the firm after the contract is signed, is also unobservable by the government (moral hazard).

The total cost is observable, and given by:

\[
C = (\hat{\beta} - e)q + \epsilon,
\]

where \( \epsilon \) is a random variable with zero mean describing an \textit{ex post} cost disturbance.
We assume that the firm, instead of maximizing profit net of the disutility of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1986), has also a preference for higher output. An output that is higher (lower) than a reference level, $q_{ref}$, yields satisfaction (dissatisfaction).

The \textit{ex ante} utility level of the firm is:

$$U = E(t) + \delta(q - q_{ref}) - \psi(e),$$

(1)

where $E(t)$ is the expected value of the net payment received from the government (the gross payment is $t + C$), $\delta \geq 0$ is the marginal utility of output, $q_{ref}$ is the output reference level, and $\psi(e)$, stands for the disutility of effort, with $\psi''(e) > 0$, $\psi'''(e) > 0$ and $\psi'''(e) \geq 0$.

The firm accepts the contract if and only if it leads to $U \geq 0$.

The social value of the public good is $S(q)$, with marginal social value strictly positive and decreasing, $S'(q) > 0$ and $S''(q) < 0$, for any $q \in [0, \bar{q})$. We also set $S(0) = 0$ and $S'(\bar{q}) = 0$ (thus $\bar{q}$ fully covers the needs of the population).

Public good provision is financed by a distortionary mechanism (taxes, for example) so that the social cost of raising one unit is $1 + \lambda$. The welfare of consumers is the social value of the public good net of the cost of providing it:

$$S(q) - (1 + \lambda)E(t + C).$$

For the objective of the government, $W$, we consider two possibilities:

(i) the government maximizes the sum of the consumer’s welfare with the utility of the firm, (this case corresponds to setting $k = 0$, below);

(ii) the government maximizes the sum of the consumer’s welfare with the profit of the firm, net of the disutility of effort (corresponds to setting $k = 1$, below).

In fact, we also allow for intermediate cases (any $k \in [0, 1]$, below).

The problem of the government is:

$$\max_{q,e,t} \int_{\hat{\beta}} S(q) - (1 + \lambda)E(t + C) + U - k\delta(q - q_{ref})d\hat{\beta}$$

\footnote{Observe that the only effect of the output reference level is to shift the participation constraint. It would be equivalent to consider $U = E(t) + \delta q - \psi(e)$, with participation for $U \geq \delta q_{ref}$.}
subject to

\[ U \geq 0. \]

To wrap up, we make the timing of the game explicit:

1. The firm observes its intrinsic marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} \) (adverse selection);

2. The government proposes a contract which specifies an output, \( q(\beta) \), and a net payment, \( t(\beta, C) \), that depend on the intrinsic marginal cost that is announced by the firm, \( \beta \), and on the observed total cost, \( C \);

3. The firm accepts (or rejects) the contract, announces \( \beta \), and chooses an unobservable level of effort, \( e \) (moral hazard);

4. The government observes the output, \( q \), and the total cost, \( C \), and makes the corresponding payment, \( t(\beta, C) + C \), to the firm.

3 The case of complete information

As a benchmark case, we start by considering that the government is able to observe the intrinsic marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} \), as well as the level of effort, \( e \).

The problem of the government is:

\[
\max_{q,e,t} \{ S(q) - (1 + \lambda)E(t + C) + U - k\delta(q - q_{ref}) \}
\]

subject to

\[ U \geq 0. \]

Using (1), the problem can be written as:

\[
\max_{q,e,U} \left\{ S(q) - (1 + \lambda) \left[ U - \delta(q - q_{ref}) + \psi(e) + (\hat{\beta} - e)q \right] + U - k\delta(q - q_{ref}) \right\}
\]

subject to

\[ U \geq 0. \]

Using (2), the problem can be written as:

\[
\max_{q,e,U} \left\{ S(q) - (1 + \lambda) \left[ U - \delta(q - q_{ref}) + \psi(e) + (\hat{\beta} - e)q \right] + U - k\delta(q - q_{ref}) \right\}
\]

subject to

\[ U \geq 0. \]

With \( \lambda > 0 \), the participation constraint is binding \( (U = 0) \).
The first order conditions of problem (2) are:

\[ S'(q) = (1 + \lambda) (\hat{\beta} - e - \delta) + k\delta, \quad (3) \]
\[ \psi'(e) = q. \quad (4) \]

The second order conditions of problem (2) are:\(^5\)

\[ S''(q) < 0, \]
\[ \psi''(e) > 0, \]
\[ S''(q)\psi''(e) + (1 + \lambda) < 0. \]

We make the following assumptions for the problem to be well-behaved.

**Assumption 1.**

(i) \( \lambda > 0; \)
(ii) \( \forall q \in [0, \bar{q}], \ S''(q)\psi''(0) < -(1 + \lambda); \)
(iii) \( S'(0) > (1 + \lambda)(\hat{\beta} - \delta) + k\delta; \)
(iv) \( \psi'(\beta - \delta) > \bar{q}. \)

Assumption 1 guarantees that: (i) the participation constraint is binding; (ii) the second order conditions are satisfied; (iii) the optimal output is positive; and (iv) the marginal cost is positive.

The optimal level of output, \( q^*_c \), and the optimal level of effort, \( e^*_c \), are decreasing functions of the intrinsic marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} \), and increasing functions of the bureaucratic bias toward higher output, \( \delta \).\(^6\)

We also find that the social welfare is increasing (decreasing) with the bureaucratic bias, \( \delta \), if and only if the optimal output, \( q^*_c \), is higher (lower) than the reference output, \( q_{ref} \). To see this, apply the Envelope Theorem:\(^7\)

\[ \frac{dW^*}{d\delta} = \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \delta} = (1 + \lambda - k)(q^*_c - q_{ref}). \]

\(^5\)Corresponding to \( \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial q^2} < 0, \ \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial e^2} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial q \partial e} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial e \partial c} < \left( \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial q \partial c} \right)^2. \)

\(^6\)This can be seen by inspection of conditions (3) and (4).

\(^7\)See, for example, Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
The optimal incentive scheme

In this section, we consider the case in which the government is not able to observe the intrinsic marginal cost of the firm, $\hat{\beta}$, nor the effort level chosen by the firm, $e$.

The government offers a contract to the firm, $(q(\beta), e(\beta), t(\beta, C))$, specifying an output, $q(\beta)$, an effort level, $e(\beta)$, and a payment scheme, $t(\beta, C)$, that depend on the intrinsic marginal cost announced by the firm, $\beta$.

A firm with an intrinsic marginal cost $\hat{\beta}$ that announces an intrinsic marginal cost $\beta$ will choose an individually optimal level of effort, attaining an utility given by:

$$U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = \max_e \left( E \left\{ t[\beta, (\hat{\beta} - e)q + e] \right\} + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi(e) \right).$$

Thanks to the Revelation Principle, we restrict the contract to be incentive-compatible.

It must induce the firm to choose the specified effort, $e = e(\beta)$, and reveal truthfully its intrinsic marginal cost, $\beta = \hat{\beta}$:

$$e(\beta) \in \arg\max_e \left( E \left\{ t[\beta, (\hat{\beta} - e)q + e] \right\} + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi(e) \right)$$

and

$$\hat{\beta} \in \arg\max_{\beta \in [\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta}]} U(\beta, \hat{\beta}).$$ (5)

The firm’s optimization problem

We start by analyzing the case in which there is no cost disturbance ($\epsilon = 0$).

Truthful behavior implies a total cost given by $C(\beta) = [\beta - e(\beta)]q(\beta)$. If the observed cost, $C = [\hat{\beta} - e]q(\beta)$, is different, the government imposes an extreme penalty to the firm (knife-edge mechanism):

$$C \neq C(\beta) \Rightarrow t(\beta, C) = -\infty.$$
Still, a firm with cost \( \hat{\beta} \) can claim to have a higher cost, \( \beta > \hat{\beta} \), and choose a lower level of effort, \( e < e(\beta) \), such that \( C = C(\beta) \). In this case, the firm’s deviation is concealed. Such level of effort is \( e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = e(\beta) + \hat{\beta} - \beta \), and the resulting net transfer is \( s(\beta) = t[\beta, C(\beta)] \).

For any \( \hat{\beta} \in [\beta, \beta] \), truthful revelation must maximize the utility of the firm (5):

\[
\hat{\beta} \in \text{argmax}_{\beta \in [\beta, \beta]} U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = \text{argmax}_{\beta \in [\beta, \beta]} \left\{ s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta) + \hat{\beta} - \beta \right] \right\}.
\]

(6)

Let \( V(\hat{\beta}) \) be the value function of the firm’s maximization problem:

\[
V(\hat{\beta}) = \max_{\beta \in [\beta, \beta]} U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = \max_{\beta \in [\beta, \beta]} \left\{ s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta) + \hat{\beta} - \beta \right] \right\}.
\]

From the Envelope Theorem, we obtain the first order incentive compatibility constraint:

\[
V'(\hat{\beta}) = -\psi' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right].
\]

(7)

Incentive compatibility implies equation (7), which tells us that the derivative of the value function is equal to the symmetric of the marginal disutility of effort. More efficient firms obtain higher utility.\(^{10}\)

The local second order condition, \( \frac{\partial^2 U(\beta, \hat{\beta})}{\partial \beta^2} \bigg|_{\beta = \hat{\beta}} < 0 \), holds if (see Appendix B.1):

\[
e'(\hat{\beta}) < 1.
\]

(8)

Therefore, the marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} - e \), does increases with the intrinsic marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} \).

The incentive compatibility condition (6) is equivalent to the first and second order conditions, (7) and (8) (see Appendix B.3).

### 4.2 The government’s optimization problem

The objective of the government is to maximize expected social welfare:

\[
\max_{q(\hat{\beta}), e(\hat{\beta}), t(\hat{\beta})} E \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) \left[ t(\hat{\beta}) + C(\hat{\beta}) \right] + V(\hat{\beta}) - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] d\hat{\beta}
\]

(9)

\(^{10}\)The incentive compatibility condition (6) implies that the effort function, \( e(\beta) \), and the utility function, \( V(\hat{\beta}) \), are differentiable almost everywhere (see Appendix B.2).
subject to, for all $\hat{\beta}$,

$$V(\hat{\beta}) \geq 0, \quad (10)$$

$$V'(\hat{\beta}) = -\psi' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right], \quad (7)$$

$$e'(\hat{\beta}) < 1. \quad (8)$$

From equation (7), $V$ is a decreasing function of $\hat{\beta}$, so we can replace (10) by $V(\bar{\beta}) = 0$.

We start by studying the following relaxed problem in which the second order incentive compatibility condition (8) is ignored (later, we shall check that this condition holds):

$$\max_{q(\hat{\beta}), e(\hat{\beta}), V(\hat{\beta})} \int_{\hat{\beta}}^{\bar{\beta}} S \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] \right\} -$$

$$-(1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) \right] q(\hat{\beta}) + V(\hat{\beta}) - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] d\hat{\beta} \quad (11)$$

subject to

$$V(\bar{\beta}) = 0, \quad (12)$$

$$V'(\hat{\beta}) = -\psi' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right]. \quad (7)$$

This is an optimal control problem with state variable $V(\hat{\beta})$ and control variables $e(\hat{\beta})$ and $q(\hat{\beta})$. The first order conditions are:

$$V(\bar{\beta}) = 0, \quad (12)$$

$$V'(\hat{\beta}) = -\psi' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right], \quad (7)$$

$$S' \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] = (1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] + k\delta, \quad (13)$$

$$\psi' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] = q(\hat{\beta}) - \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi'' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right]. \quad (14)$$

This relaxed problem (11) has a unique interior optimum (see Appendix B.4).

To check that the omitted condition (8) is satisfied, differentiate equations (13) and (14) with respect to $\hat{\beta}$ (we use simplified notation, below, for simplicity of exposition):

$$\begin{align*}
S'' q' &= (1 + \lambda)(1 - e') \\
\psi'' e' &= q' - \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} \left[ \psi'' + (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi''' e' \right]
\end{align*} \Leftrightarrow \begin{align*}
q' &= \frac{1+\lambda}{S''} (1 - e') \\
e' &= \frac{1+\lambda - \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) S'' \psi''}{S'' \psi'' + 1+\lambda + \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) S'' \psi''}. \quad (15)
\end{align*}$$

Using Assumption 1, we find that $e' < 0$ and $q' < 0$, implying that (8) is verified. The solution of the relaxed problem (11) also solves the problem of the government (9).
As in the case of complete information, the optimal level of output, \( q^\ast \), and the optimal level of effort, \( e^\ast \), are decreasing functions of the intrinsic marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} \). The more efficient is the firm, the higher are the output and the effort.

The equilibrium transfer is such that:

\[
t^\ast(\hat{\beta}) = V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q^\ast(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}} \right] + \psi \left[ e^\ast(\hat{\beta}) \right].
\]

Integrating (7), we obtain:

\[
V(\hat{\beta}) = V(\overline{\beta}) + \int_{\hat{\beta}}^{\overline{\beta}} \psi'[e(\gamma)] \, d\gamma.
\]

Then:

\[
t^\ast(\hat{\beta}) = \int_{\hat{\beta}}^{\overline{\beta}} \psi'[e(\gamma)] \, d\gamma - \delta \left[ q^\ast(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}} \right] + \psi \left[ e^\ast(\hat{\beta}) \right].
\]

We find that the effort and the output are increasing with the manager’s marginal utility of output, \( \delta \). The intuition behind this is that an increase in \( \delta \) gives more weight to the output level in the firm’s objective function and, hence, also in the social welfare function. This translates into higher output and higher effort levels, the later because the cost savings associated with the effort are proportional to the output level.

**Lemma 4.1.**

The output and the effort, \( q^\ast(\hat{\beta}) \) and \( e^\ast(\hat{\beta}) \), increase with the bureaucratic bias, \( \delta \).

**Proof.** See Appendix B.7. □

We also find that an increase in the value of \( \delta \) increases (reduces) expected social welfare if the expected output level is larger (lower) than the reference output. This means that, when the reference output is lower than expected output, a manager who is more “bureaucratic” is less costly to society as a whole, because the manager receives in a non-monetary form a larger part of the informational rent. The opposite occurs when the reference output is higher than expected output.
Lemma 4.2.

The expected social welfare, $W^*$, increases (decreases) with the bureaucratic bias, $\delta$, if and only if the expected output, $\int_\beta^\beta q^*(\hat{\beta}) d\hat{\beta}$, is larger (lower) than the reference output, $q_{ref}$.

Proof. See Appendix B.7. □

4.3 Implementation

In this section, we study the implementation problem. Let $\{q^*(\hat{\beta}), e^*(\hat{\beta}), V(\hat{\beta})\}$ denote the solution to (11), and let $t^*(\hat{\beta})$ and $C^*(\hat{\beta})$ denote the corresponding transfer and cost.

When there is no cost disturbance, $\epsilon = 0$, to implement the solution, it suffices for the government to: (i) ask the firm to announce its marginal cost, $\beta$; (ii) choose output $q^*(\beta)$; and (iii) give transfer $t^*(\beta)$ if $C = C^*(\beta)$, and $-\infty$ otherwise.

However, this “knife-edge” mechanism does not work if there is any cost disturbance because the probability of incurring in an extreme penalty becomes positive and makes the firm unwilling to participate.

To implement the optimal solution in the more general case of cost disturbance, we must find a transfer function $t(\beta, C)$ that is such that:

\[
\hat{\beta}, e^*(\hat{\beta}) \in \arg\max_{\beta, e} \left\{ E \left\{ t(\beta, \beta - e)q(\beta) + e \right\} + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi(e) \right\}
\]

and

\[
E \left\{ t(\hat{\beta}, [\hat{\beta} - e^*(\hat{\beta}] q^*(\hat{\beta}) + e) \right\} = t^*(\hat{\beta}).
\]

Consider the following transfer function (linear in observed cost):

\[
t(\beta, C) = t^*(\beta) + K^*(\beta) [C^*(\beta) - C],
\]

where

\[
K^*(\beta) = \frac{\psi'[e^*(\beta)]}{q^*(\beta)}.
\]

If the observed cost is higher (lower) than expected, $C > C^*(\beta)$, the government reimburses (receives) a fraction of the difference, $1 - K^*(\beta)$, while the firm supports the remaining
fraction, $K^*(\beta)$. The payment scheme is, then, composed by a fixed payment, $C^*(\hat{\beta})$, plus a partial cost reimbursement, $[1 - K^*(\beta)] [C^*(\beta) - C]$.

We show that this contract, $[q^*(\beta), e^*(\beta), t(\beta, C)]$, with $t(\beta, C) = t^*(\beta) + K^*(\beta) [C^*(\beta) - C]$, is optimal.

**Proposition 1.**

*Under Assumption 1, the optimal incentive compatible allocation, $[q^*(\hat{\beta}), e^*(\hat{\beta}), t^*(\hat{\beta})]$, can be implemented by a contract that is linear in observed cost:*

$$t(\beta, C) = t^*(\beta) + K^*(\beta) [C^*(\beta) - C].$$

**Proof.** See Appendix B.5.

The linear scheme implements the optimal allocation. Furthermore, it has a very appealing property: the optimal allocation is independent of the distribution of cost uncertainty. The linear scheme is the only scheme that implements the optimal allocation for any probability distribution of the cost disturbance (see Appendix B.6).

We find that the “power” of the optimal incentive scheme, that is, the fraction of the cost that is supported by the firm, $K^*$, is increasing with the bureaucratic bias, $\delta$, for any value of the intrinsic marginal cost, $\hat{\beta}$ (if $\psi'''$ is small enough).

**Lemma 4.3.**

*For small enough $\psi'''$, the fraction of cost that is supported by the firm, $K^*(\hat{\beta})$, is increasing with $\delta$. That is: $\frac{dK^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} > 0$.*

**Proof.** See Appendix B.7.

5 The cost reimbursement payment system

In the case in which there is no cost-reducing effort ($C = \hat{\beta}q + \epsilon$), the government may propose the financing system known as cost-reimbursement, which consists in: (i) compensating the firm for all the costs which it incurs; plus (ii) a net payment in advance, $t(\hat{\beta})$. 


which does not depend on actual cost, and can even be negative because a bureaucratic
firm enjoys producing a high output.

The utility of the firm \( \{U = t(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{\text{ref}}]\} \) is independent of \( \hat{\beta} \). Therefore, it must be
constant across \( \beta \) for the firm to tell the truth. Hence, the government will choose \( t(\beta) \) and \( q(\beta) \) such that \( U(\beta) = 0 \), for any announcement \( \beta \) (notice that the participation constraint
is binding for \( \lambda > 0 \), which is the economically interesting case).

To produce a level of output that is lower than \( q_{\text{ref}} \), the firm requires a positive net payment
to participate, \( t(\hat{\beta}) > 0 \). If the output is higher than \( q_{\text{ref}} \), the firm accepts a negative
transfer, \( t(\hat{\beta}) < 0 \):

\[
U(\hat{\beta}) = 0 \Leftrightarrow t(\hat{\beta}) = -\delta \left[q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}}\right]. \tag{17}
\]

Observe that the bureaucratic bias, \( \delta \), leads to a significant difference with respect to the
usual reimbursement payment (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), which is characterized by a null
net transfer. Here, the net transfer (which may be interpreted as an advance payment,
independent of the actual cost) may be positive or negative.

The government’s problem is:

\[
\max_{q(\hat{\beta}), t(\hat{\beta})} \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[q(\hat{\beta})\right] - (1 + \lambda) \left[C(\hat{\beta}) + t(\hat{\beta})\right] + t(\hat{\beta}) + \delta \left[q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}}\right] -
- k\delta \left[q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}}\right] d\hat{\beta} \tag{18}
\]

subject to

\[
t(\hat{\beta}) = -\delta \left[q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}}\right]. \tag{17}
\]

Equivalently:

\[
\max_{q(\hat{\beta})} \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[q(\hat{\beta})\right] - (1 + \lambda) \left\{\hat{\beta}q(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}}\right]\right\} - k\delta \left[q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}}\right] d\hat{\beta}. \tag{19}
\]

The first order condition of problem (19) is:

\[
S' \left[q(\hat{\beta})\right] = (1 + \lambda)\hat{\beta} - (1 + \lambda - k)\delta. \tag{20}
\]

The second order condition is verified because \( S''(q) < 0 \).

By inspection of (20), we see that the output level is increasing with the bureaucratic bias.
When compared with the optimum incentive scheme, cost reimbursement leads to a lower level of output. The comparison is actually unfair, because the cost-reducing effort is not available, and therefore the marginal cost is higher.

As in the case of the optimal incentive scheme, expected social welfare increases (decreases) with the bureaucratic bias whenever the expected output level is higher (lower) than the reference output.\footnote{Applying the Envelope Theorem, we obtain \( \frac{dW^*}{d\delta} = \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \delta} = (1 + \lambda - k) \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} (q^* - q_{ref}) d\hat{\beta}. \)}

### 6 The prospective payment system

The prospective payment system consists of a fixed payment, \( g(\beta) \), independent of the observed cost.\footnote{The prospective payment system is used, in some countries, in contracts between governments and hospitals for the provision of health care services. A fixed payment is attributed, based on the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) of an hospital’s admission record, independently of the costs that the hospital comes to incur in.} The net monetary transfer is \( g(\beta) - C(\hat{\beta}, e, q, \epsilon) = g(\beta) - (\hat{\beta} - e)q(\beta) - \epsilon. \)

#### 6.1 The firm’s optimization problem

Given the true value of the intrinsic marginal cost, \( \hat{\beta} \), and the announced value, \( \beta \), the firm chooses the effort level, \( e \), that maximizes expected utility:

\[
U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = \max_e \left\{ g(\beta) - (\hat{\beta} - e)q(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi(e) \right\}.
\]

The first order condition with respect to \( e \) is:

\[
\psi' [e(\beta)] = q(\beta).
\] \hspace{1cm} (21)

Since the government’s transfer does not depend on the observed cost, the relationship between effort and output level is the same as in the case of complete information.
The firm truthfully announces its intrinsic marginal cost if and only if:

\[ \hat{\beta} \in \arg \max_{\beta \in [\beta, \hat{\beta}]} \left\{ g(\beta) - \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\beta) \right] q(\beta) + \delta \left[ q(\beta) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta) \right] \right\}. \]

The first order incentive compatibility constraint is:

\[ V'(\hat{\beta}) = -q(\hat{\beta}). \] (22)

And the second order incentive constraint is:

\[ q'(\hat{\beta}) < 0. \] (23)

For the firm to participate, given (22), it is sufficient that \( V(\beta) = 0. \)

### 6.2 The government’s optimization problem

The objective of the government is to maximize expected social welfare:

\[
\max_{\hat{\beta}, e(\beta)} \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) g(\hat{\beta}) + g(\hat{\beta}) - \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\beta) \right] q(\beta) + \\
+ \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta) \right] - k \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] d\hat{\beta} \]

subject to

\[ V(\beta) = 0, \] (25)

\[ V'(\hat{\beta}) = -q(\hat{\beta}), \] (22)

\[ q'(\hat{\beta}) < 0. \] (23)

We shall solve the following relaxed problem obtained by dropping (23) and then check that the solution satisfies this constraint.

\[
\max_{\hat{\beta}, e(\beta), V(\hat{\beta})} \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] \right\} - \\
-(1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) \right] q(\hat{\beta}) + V(\hat{\beta}) - k \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] \right] \] (26)
subject to

\[ V(\bar{\beta}) = 0, \]  
\[ V'(\hat{\beta}) = -q(\hat{\beta}), \]  
\[ \psi'[e(\hat{\beta})] = q(\hat{\beta}), \]  
\[ S'[q(\hat{\beta})] = (1 + \lambda) \left[ \bar{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] + k\delta + \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta). \]  

This is an optimal control problem with state variable \( V(\hat{\beta}) \) and control variables \( e(\hat{\beta}) \) and \( q(\hat{\beta}) \). The first order conditions, written below, are obtained in Appendix D.1:

\[ V(\bar{\beta}) = 0, \]  
\[ V'(\hat{\beta}) = -q(\hat{\beta}), \]  
\[ \psi'[e(\hat{\beta})] = q(\hat{\beta}), \]  
\[ S'[q(\hat{\beta})] = (1 + \lambda) \left[ \bar{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] + k\delta + \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta). \]  

The first order conditions are sufficient under Assumption 1 (ii) (see Appendix D.1).

We can verify that the more efficient is the firm, the higher are the output and the effort, by differentiating equations (27) and (21):

\[ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} S''q_p^* = (1 + \lambda)(1 - e_p^*) + \lambda \\ \psi''e_p^* = q_p^* \end{array} \right\} \iff \left\{ \begin{array}{l} q_p'' = \psi'' \frac{1 + 2\lambda}{\psi''S'' + 1 + \lambda} \\ e_p'' = \frac{1 + 2\lambda}{\psi''S'' + 1 + \lambda}. \end{array} \right\} \]

We find that \( e^* < 0 \) and \( q^* < 0 \) which implies that (23) is verified. The solution of the relaxed problem (26) is the solution of the fully constrained problem (24).

The equilibrium transfer is such that \( t_p^*(\hat{\beta}) = V_p^*(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi \left[ e_p^*(\beta) \right] \), therefore:

\[ t_p^*(\hat{\beta}) = \int_{\beta}^{\bar{\beta}} q_p^*(\xi) \, d\xi - \delta \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi \left[ e_p^*(\hat{\beta}) \right]. \]

The firm tends to announce a low efficiency for the government to transfer a high prospective payment. Bureaucratic behavior counterbalances this tendency, alleviating the problem of adverse selection.

We find that the output and effort levels are increasing in \( \delta \) (see Appendix C.2, Lemma C.1), and that the expected social welfare increases (decreases) with the bureaucratic bias whenever the expected output level is larger (lower) than the reference output, as with the previous financing systems (see Appendix C.2, Lemma C.2).
7 Concluding remarks

We have studied procurement contracts between the government (principal) and a bureaucratic firm (agent), in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Three different payment systems were considered: the optimal incentive scheme, cost reimbursement and prospective payment. In any case, with a bureaucratic provider, we observe a higher level of public good provision. Under the prospective payment and the optimal incentive schemes, the effort level is also higher. The optimal incentive scheme is shown to remain linear in observed cost but to become more powered (the firm supports a higher fraction of the costs) when the manager is more bureaucratic. Welfare improves if and only if the expected output is higher than the output reference level of the managers.

The value of the manager’s marginal utility of output is, in the present model, known by the regulator. It would be interesting to account for the fact that it is more likely to be his/her private information and to analyze the resulting equilibrium in such a framework. This will be the subject of further research.

A Appendix: Numerical illustration

A.1 Complete information

As an illustrative example, we let the social value of the public good be \( S(q) = 2q - q^2 \) and the disutility of effort be \( \psi(e) = e^2/2 \).

The problem of the government under complete information (2) becomes:

\[
\max_{q,e,U} \left\{ 2q - q^2 - (1 + \lambda) \left[ U - \delta(q - q_{ref}) + \frac{e^2}{2} + (\hat{\beta} - e)q \right] + U - k\delta(q - q_{ref}) \right\} \quad (28)
\]

subject to

\[
U \geq 0.
\]

Since the participation condition is always binding, we can write it as:

\[
\max_{q,e} \left\{ 2q - q^2 - (1 + \lambda) \left[ -\delta(q - q_{ref}) + \frac{e^2}{2} + (\hat{\beta} - e)q \right] - k\delta(q - q_{ref}) \right\}. \quad (29)
\]
The first order conditions of problem (29) are:

\[ \frac{\partial f}{\partial q} = 0 \iff 2 - 2q - (1 + \lambda) \left( -\delta + \hat{\beta} - e \right) - k\delta = 0, \quad (30) \]

\[ \frac{\partial f}{\partial e} = 0 \iff -(1 + \lambda)(e - q) = 0. \quad (31) \]

From (30) and (31), we obtain the complete information solution:

\[ q_c^* = \frac{1}{1 - \lambda} \left[ 2 - k\delta - (1 + \lambda) \left( \hat{\beta} - \delta \right) \right], \]

\[ e_c^* = q_c^*, \]

\[ t_c^* = \delta (q_{ref} - q_c^*) + \frac{e_c^2}{2}. \]

For the graphical analysis we also set \( \lambda = 0.1, \hat{\beta} = 1.1, \bar{\beta} = 1.3, q_{ref} = 1, \delta = 0.05 \) or \( \delta = 0, \)

and \( k = 0 \) or \( k = 1 \) (which satisfy Assumption 1).

![Figure 1: Output with (\( \delta = 0.05 \)) and without bureaucracy (\( \delta = 0 \)).](image1)

![Figure 2: Social welfare with (\( \delta = 0.05 \)) and without bureaucracy (\( \delta = 0 \)).](image2)

### A.2 Optimal incentive scheme

Consider problem (11), and replace the social value by \( S(q) = 2q - q^2 \) and the disutility of effort by \( \psi(e) = e^2/2. \) The Hamiltonian becomes:

\[ H = 2q(\hat{\beta}) - q(\hat{\beta})^2 - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \frac{e(\hat{\beta})^2}{2} + \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) \right] q(\hat{\beta}) \right\} + \\
+ V(\hat{\beta}) - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \mu e(\hat{\beta}). \]
The Pontryagin principle yields:
\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial q} = 2 - 2q(\hat{\beta}) - (1 + \lambda) [\hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \hat{\delta}] - k\delta = 0, \tag{32}
\]
\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial e} = -(1 + \lambda) [e(\hat{\beta}) - q(\hat{\beta}) - \mu = 0, \tag{33}
\]
\[
\mu'(\beta) = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial V} = \lambda. \tag{34}
\]
Furthermore, \(\beta\) is a free boundary so that
\[
\mu(\beta) = 0. \tag{35}
\]
Integrating (34) and using (35), we obtain
\[
\mu(\hat{\beta}) = \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta). \tag{36}
\]
Using (36) in (33), we find:
\[
e(\hat{\beta}) = q(\hat{\beta}) - \left(\frac{\lambda}{1 + \lambda}\right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta). \tag{37}
\]
Replacing (37) in (32), the level of output is obtained:
\[
q^*(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 - k\delta - \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta) - (1 + \lambda) (\hat{\beta} - \delta)}{1 - \lambda}. \tag{38}
\]
And given (38), equation (37) becomes:
\[
e^*(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 - k\delta - \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta) - (1 + \lambda) (\hat{\beta} - \delta)}{1 - \lambda} \tag{39}
\]
\[
- \left(\frac{\lambda}{1 + \lambda}\right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta).
\]
The net transfer can be calculated from:
\[
t^*(\hat{\beta}) = \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} e^*(\gamma)d\gamma - \delta \left[q^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref}\right] + \frac{e^*(\hat{\beta})^2}{2}. \tag{40}
\]
In sum:
\[
q^*(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 - k\delta - \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta) - (1 + \lambda) (\hat{\beta} - \delta)}{1 - \lambda}, \tag{41}
\]
\[
e^*(\hat{\beta}) = q^*(\hat{\beta}) - \left(\frac{\lambda}{1 + \lambda}\right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta), \tag{42}
\]
\[
t^*(\hat{\beta}) = \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} e^*(\gamma)d\gamma - \delta \left[q^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref}\right] + \frac{e^*(\hat{\beta})^2}{2}. \tag{43}
\]
In this numerical example, the bureaucratic bias reduces social welfare. This occurs because the reference output is higher than the expected output, implying an increase of the monetary transfer from the government to the firm (for the participation constraint to be satisfied).

### A.3 Cost reimbursement

Replacing $S \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] = 2q(\hat{\beta}) - q(\hat{\beta})^2$ and $t(\hat{\beta}) = -\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right]$ in problem (19):

$$\max_{q(\hat{\beta}), t(\hat{\beta})} \int_{\hat{\beta}}^{\hat{\beta}} 2q(\hat{\beta}) - q(\hat{\beta})^2 - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ \hat{\beta}q(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] \right\} - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] d\hat{\beta}. \quad (39)$$

The first order condition of problem (39) is: $2 - 2q(\hat{\beta}) = (1 + \lambda) \left( \hat{\beta} - \delta \right) + k\delta$.

Simplifying, we get the output:

$$q^*_r(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 - k\delta - (1 + \lambda) \left( \hat{\beta} - \delta \right)}{2}.$$

The net transfer is:

$$t^*_r(\hat{\beta}) = -\delta \left[ \frac{2 - k\delta - (1 + \lambda) \left( \hat{\beta} - \delta \right)}{2} - q_{ref} \right].$$
The second order condition of problem (39) is satisfied: \(\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial q^2} < 0 \iff -2 < 0\).

Then, the solution is:

\[
q^*_r(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 - k\delta - (1 + \lambda) (\hat{\beta} - \delta)}{2},
\]
\[
t^*_r(\hat{\beta}) = -\delta \left[ \frac{2 - k\delta - (1 + \lambda) (\hat{\beta} - \delta)}{2} - q_{ref} \right].
\]

Figure 5: Output with \((\delta = 0.05)\) and without bureaucracy \((\delta = 0)\).

Figure 6: Social welfare with \((\delta = 0.05)\) and without bureaucracy \((\delta = 0)\).

A.4 Prospective payment

Again, we assume that the social value is \(S(q) = 2q - q^2\) and that the disutility of effort is \(\psi(e) = e^2/2\).

The Hamiltonian of problem (26) becomes:

\[
H = 2q(\hat{\beta}) - q(\hat{\beta})^2 - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \frac{e(\hat{\beta})^2}{2} + \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) \right] q(\hat{\beta}) \right\}
+ V(\hat{\beta}) - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \nu q(\hat{\beta}),
\]

where \(\nu\) is the multiplier associated with (22).

The Pontryagin Principle yields:

\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial q} = 2 - 2q(\hat{\beta}) - (1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] - k\delta - \nu = 0, \tag{40}
\]
∂H
∂e = −(1 + λ) [e(\hat{\beta}) − q(\hat{\beta})] = 0 ⇔ e(\hat{\beta}) = q(\hat{\beta}),

(41)

ν'(β) = −∂H
∂V = λ.

(42)

Furthermore, \( \hat{\beta} \) is a free boundary so that

\[ ν(\hat{\beta}) = 0. \]

(43)

Integrating (42) and using (43), we obtain:

\[ ν(\hat{\beta}) = \lambda(\hat{\beta} − \hat{\beta}). \]

(44)

Replacing equation (44) in equation (40) we obtain:

\[ 2 − 2q(\hat{\beta}) = (1 + λ) \left[ \hat{\beta} − e(\hat{\beta}) − \delta \right] + kδ + \lambda(\hat{\beta} − \hat{\beta}). \]

(45)

Replacing the equation (41) into the equation (45) we obtain the level of output:

\[ q_p^∗(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 − \hat{\beta} + λ \left( \beta + \delta − 2\hat{\beta} \right) + \delta (1 − k)}{1 − λ}. \]

The net transfer is:

\[ t_p^∗(\hat{\beta}) = \int_\hat{\beta}^\beta q_p^*(\xi) \, d\xi − \delta \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) − q_{ref} \right] + \frac{e_p^2(\hat{\beta})}{2}. \]

The solution is:

\[ q_p^∗(\hat{\beta}) = \frac{2 − \hat{\beta} + λ \left( \beta + \delta − 2\hat{\beta} \right) + \delta (1 − k)}{1 − λ}, \]

\[ e_p^∗(\hat{\beta}) = q_p^*(\hat{\beta}), \]

\[ t_p^∗(\hat{\beta}) = \int_\hat{\beta}^\beta q_p^*(\xi) \, d\xi − \delta \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) − q_{ref} \right] + \frac{e_p^2(\hat{\beta})}{2}. \]
Figure 7: Output with ($\delta = 0.05$) and without bureaucracy ($\delta = 0$).

Figure 8: Social welfare with ($\delta = 0.05$) and without bureaucracy ($\delta = 0$).

B Appendix: The optimal incentive scheme

B.1 Local second order condition

The local second-order condition of the maximization program, \[ \frac{\partial^2 U(\beta, \hat{\beta})}{\partial \beta^2} \bigg|_{\beta = \hat{\beta}} < 0, \] is equivalent to:

\[ s''(\hat{\beta}) + \delta q''(\hat{\beta}) - \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})][e'(\hat{\beta}) - 1]^2 - \psi'[e(\hat{\beta})]e''(\hat{\beta}) < 0. \] (46)

We want to show that it is equivalent to $e'(\hat{\beta}) < 1$.

Start by noticing that, with the incentive compatibility condition (6) being satisfied, the value function is:

\[ V(\hat{\beta}) = s(\hat{\beta}) + \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right]. \] (47)

Evaluating the derivative of (47) and equating to (7), we obtain:

\[ s'(\hat{\beta}) + \delta q'(\hat{\beta}) - \psi'[e(\hat{\beta})][e'(\hat{\beta}) - 1] = 0. \] (48)

The derivative of (48) is:

\[ s''(\hat{\beta}) + \delta q''(\hat{\beta}) - \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})] e'(\hat{\beta}) - 1 - \psi'[e(\hat{\beta})] e''(\hat{\beta}) = 0. \] (49)

Subtracting (49) from (46), the local second order condition becomes:

\[ -\psi''[e(\hat{\beta})] [-e'(\hat{\beta}) + 1] < 0. \]
Since $\psi'' > 0$, the local second order is verified if and only if:

$$e'(\hat{\beta}) < 1.$$ 

### B.2 Differentiability of effort, transfer and utility

**Proposition 2.**

*If deviations in the firm’s concealment set are not profitable (6), then the effort function, $e(\beta)$, and the utility function, $V(\hat{\beta})$, are differentiable almost everywhere.*

The proof of Proposition 2 is divided in the four claims, below.

**Claim B.1.**

$$\beta < \hat{\beta} \Rightarrow e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \geq e(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\beta}).$$

**Proof.**

From the incentive compatibility constraints, we know that:

$$s(\hat{\beta}) + \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\beta}) \right] \geq s(\beta) + \delta \left[ q(\beta) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right]$$

and

$$s(\beta) + \delta \left[ q(\beta) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \beta) \right] \geq s(\hat{\beta}) + \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}, \beta) \right].$$

Adding the two inequalities, we obtain:

$$\psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \beta) \right] \geq \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\beta}) \right] - \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}, \beta) \right]. \quad (50)$$

Notice that, by definition:

$$e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) - e(\beta, \beta) = \hat{\beta} - \beta > 0$$

and

$$e(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\beta}) - e(\hat{\beta}, \beta) = \hat{\beta} - \beta > 0.$$
Since these differences coincide, strict convexity of $\psi$ together with (50) implies that:
\[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \geq e(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\beta}). \]

\[ \square \]

**Claim B.2.**

$e(\beta, \hat{\beta})$ is nonincreasing in $\beta$.

**Proof.**

Let $\beta > \beta'$ and define $\Delta(\hat{\beta}) \equiv e(\beta', \hat{\beta}) - e(\beta, \hat{\beta})$. We want to prove that $\Delta(\hat{\beta}) \geq 0$.

Notice that: $\Delta(\hat{\beta}) = e(\beta') - \beta' - e(\beta) + \beta$. Thus $\Delta(\hat{\beta})$ does not depend on $\hat{\beta}$.

Then, $\Delta(\hat{\beta}) = \Delta(\beta) = e(\beta', \beta) - e(\beta, \beta)$.

By Lemma 1, $\Delta(\beta) \geq 0$.

\[ \square \]

Since the effort level is not greater than $\bar{\beta}$, Claim B.2 implies that $e(\beta, \hat{\beta})$ is a.e. differentiable in $\beta$. Therefore, $e(\beta) = e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) + \beta - \hat{\beta}$ also is.

**Claim B.3.**

$U(\beta, \hat{\beta})$, as a function of $\beta$, is nondecreasing on $[\beta, \hat{\beta}]$ and nonincreasing on $[\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta}]$.

**Proof.**

Let us first show monotonicity on $[\beta, \hat{\beta}]$. Assume that $\beta < \beta' < \hat{\beta}$ and, by way of contradiction, $U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) > U(\beta', \hat{\beta})$. Thus:
\[ s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right] > s(\beta') + \delta [q(\beta') - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta', \hat{\beta}) \right]. \]

On the other hand, a firm with cost $\beta'$ prefers to announce $\beta'$ rather than announce $\beta$:
\[ s(\beta') + \delta [q(\beta') - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta', \beta') \right] \geq s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \beta') \right]. \]
Adding the two equations, we obtain:

\[
\psi [e(\beta, \beta')] - \psi [e(\beta', \beta')] > \psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta', \hat{\beta}) \right].
\]

By definition:

\[
e(\beta, \beta') - e(\beta', \beta') = e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) - e(\beta', \hat{\beta}).
\]

From Lemma 1, \(e(\beta, \beta') \geq e(\beta', \beta')\). Thus:

\[
e(\beta, \beta') - e(\beta', \beta') = e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) - e(\beta', \hat{\beta}) \geq 0.
\]

Since \(e(\beta, \beta') < e(\beta, \hat{\beta})\) and \(\psi\) is convex, the last equation implies:

\[
\psi [e(\beta, \beta')] - \psi [e(\beta', \beta')] > \psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right] - \psi \left[ e(\beta', \hat{\beta}) \right].
\]

Which is a contradiction.

Monotonicity on \([\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta}]\) can be proved in the same way.

\[\blacklozenge\]

**Claim B.4.**

\(s(\beta) + \delta q(\beta)\) is nonincreasing.

**Proof.**

By definition:

\[
U(\beta, \underline{\beta}) = s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \underline{\beta}) \right] \iff
\]

\[
\iff s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] = U(\beta, \underline{\beta}) + \psi \left[ e(\beta, \underline{\beta}) \right].
\]

From Claim B.2: \(\psi \left[ e(\beta, \underline{\beta}) \right]\) is nonincreasing with \(\beta\).

From Claim B.3: \(U(\beta, \underline{\beta})\) is nonincreasing with \(\beta\).

Therefore, \(s(\beta) + \delta q(\beta)\) must also be nonincreasing with \(\beta\).

\[\blacklozenge\]
Claims B.2 and B.4 imply that $e(\beta, \hat{\beta}), e(\beta)$ and $s(\beta) + \delta q(\beta)$ are a.e. differentiable. 

Hence, $U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right]$ and $V(\hat{\beta}) = s(\hat{\beta}) + \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] - \psi \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right]$ are also a.e. differentiable.

**B.3 The local second order condition implies the global one**

**Proposition 3.**

*If the local second order condition, (8), holds, then the first order condition (7) is equivalent to the incentive compatibility condition (6).*

**Proof.**

Recall that: 

$$U(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = s(\beta) + \delta [q(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi \left[ e(\beta, \hat{\beta}) \right].$$

Then:

$$\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial \beta \partial \hat{\beta}} = -\psi'' \left[ e(\beta) + \hat{\beta} - \beta \right] [e'(\beta) - 1].$$

Using strict convexity of $\psi$, we find that if the local second order condition is strictly satisfied, then $\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial \beta \partial \hat{\beta}} > 0$.

Announcing the truth gives a local maximum for the firm of type $\hat{\beta}$. Suppose that there is another announcement, $\beta \neq \hat{\beta}$, that also satisfies the first order condition:

$$\frac{\partial U(\beta, \hat{\beta})}{\partial \beta} = \frac{\partial U(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\beta})}{\partial \beta} = 0.$$

This would imply that:

$$\frac{\partial U(\beta, \hat{\beta})}{\partial \beta} = \frac{\partial U(\beta, \beta)}{\partial \beta} = 0.$$

Which contradicts the fact that $\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial \beta \partial \hat{\beta}} > 0$. The local maximum is a global maximum.
B.4 Problem of the government

Necessary conditions

Proposition 4.

The following are necessary conditions for an interior optimum of problem (11):

\[ V(\beta) = 0, \]  
(12)

\[ V'(\hat{\beta}) = -\psi' [e(\hat{\beta})], \]  
(7)

\[ S' [q(\hat{\beta})] = (1 + \lambda) \left( \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right) + k\delta, \]  
(13)

\[ \psi' [e(\hat{\beta})] = q(\hat{\beta}) - \frac{\lambda}{1 + \lambda} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi'' [e(\hat{\beta})]. \]  
(14)

Proof.

Consider problem (11). The Hamiltonian is:

\[
H = S \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi [e(\beta)] + \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) \right] q(\hat{\beta}) \right\} \\
+ V(\hat{\beta}) - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \mu \left\{ -\psi' [e(\hat{\beta})] \right\},
\]  
(51)

where \( \mu \) is the multiplier associated with (7). The Pontryagin principle\(^{13}\) yields:

\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial q} = S' [q(\hat{\beta})] - (1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] - k\delta = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial e} = - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ \psi' [e(\hat{\beta})] - q(\hat{\beta}) \right\} - \mu \rho'' [e(\hat{\beta})] = 0,
\]  
(52)

\[
\mu'(\hat{\beta}) = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial V} = \lambda.
\]  
(53)

Furthermore, \( \beta \) is a free boundary so that:

\[ \mu(\beta) = 0. \]  
(54)

Integrating (53) and using (54), we obtain:

\[ \mu(\hat{\beta}) = \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta). \]

\(^{13}\)See, for example, Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
Substituting in (52) above:

\[ \psi'[e(\hat{\beta})] = q(\hat{\beta}) - \left( \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} \right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})]. \]

\[ \square \]

Sufficient conditions

**Proposition 5.** Problem (11) has a unique interior optimum.

**Proof.**

The second order derivatives of the Hamiltonian (51) are:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial q^2} = S''[q(\hat{\beta})] < 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial e^2} = -(1 + \lambda) \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})] + \left( \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} \right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})] < 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial q \partial e} = \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial e \partial q} = 1 + \lambda. \]

The determinant of the Hessian is:

\[ |H| = S''[q(\hat{\beta})] \left\{ -(1 + \lambda) \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})] + \left( \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} \right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi'''[e(\hat{\beta})] \right\} - \]

\[ -(1 + \lambda)^2 \geq -S''[q(\hat{\beta})] (1 + \lambda) \psi''[e(\hat{\beta})] - (1 + \lambda)^2. \]

Using Assumption 1 (ii), we find that \(|H| > 0\). The first order conditions have a unique interior solution.

Finally, observe that the argument in Laffont and Tirole (1986, p.639) applies. Pontryagin’s Principle requires \(V\) to be piecewise differentiable with a finite number of pieces, while we only know that \(V\) is a.e. differentiable and decreasing. The space of a.e. differentiable decreasing functions in \([\beta, \bar{\beta}]\) is a closed and convex subset of the Banach space \(L^\infty([\beta, \bar{\beta}], \mathbb{R})\). Any decreasing function in \([\beta, \bar{\beta}]\) that is a.e. differentiable can be approximated as closely as desired by a piecewise-continuous function. Therefore, the maximum in the subspace of piecewise-continuous functions (the solution that we found above) is the maximum in the general space of a.e. differentiable functions (the solution of the general problem).
B.5 Implementation

Proposition 1

Under Assumption 1, the optimal incentive compatible allocation, \([q^*(\hat{\beta}), e^*(\hat{\beta}), t^*(\hat{\beta})]\), can be implemented by a contract that is linear in observed cost:

\[ t(\beta, C) = t^*(\beta) + K^*(\beta) [C^*(\beta) - C]. \]

Proof. A firm with intrinsic marginal cost \(\hat{\beta}\) solves:

\[
\max_{\beta, e} \left\{ t^*(\beta) + E \{ K^*(\beta) [C^*(\beta) - C] \} + \delta [q^*(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi(e) \right\}. \tag{55}
\]

Notice that:

\[ K^*(\beta) [C^*(\beta) - C] = \psi'[e^*(\beta)] \left[ e^* - e^*(\beta) + \beta - \hat{\beta} - \frac{\epsilon}{q^*(\beta)} \right]. \]

Substituting in (55), we obtain:

\[
\max_{\beta, e} \left\{ t^*(\beta) + e^*(\beta) \left[ e - e^*(\beta) + \beta - \hat{\beta} - \frac{\epsilon}{q^*(\beta)} \right] + \delta [q^*(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi(e) \right\}. \tag{56}
\]

Optimization with respect to \(e\) yields:

\[ \psi'[e^*(\beta)] = \psi'(e) \iff e = e^*(\beta). \]

Substituting again, problem (56) simplifies:

\[
\max_{\beta} \left\{ t^*(\beta) + e^*(\beta) \left[ \beta - \hat{\beta} \right] + \delta [q^*(\beta) - q_{ref}] - \psi[e^*(\beta)] \right\}. \tag{57}
\]

Optimizing with respect to \(\beta\):

\[ t'^*(\beta) + \psi''[e^*(\beta)] e^* (\beta - \hat{\beta}) + \psi'[e^*(\beta)] \delta q'^*(\beta) - \psi'[e^*(\beta)] e'^*(\beta) = 0. \]

Substituting \(\beta = \hat{\beta}\) we obtain:

\[ t'^*(\hat{\beta}) + \psi'\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] \left[ 1 - e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] + \delta q'^*(\hat{\beta}) = 0. \]

Which is true as it coincides with the first order incentive compatibility condition (7).
Notice that the firm’s second order condition for (56) is satisfied, as it boils down to:

\[ e^*(\beta) \leq 0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (57)

The second order condition (57), which is stronger than (8), is necessary for this way of implementing the optimal solution, which requires the transfer to be linear in cost.

\[ \square \]

B.6 Nonlinearity and cost disturbances

Let us show that a scheme that is not linear in cost cannot implement the optimal solution for all probability distributions of the cost disturbance.

We know that \( t(\beta, C) \) must satisfy:

\[ s^*(\beta) = E_t \{ \beta, [\beta - e^*(\beta)]q^*(\beta) + \epsilon \}. \]

If \( t \) is not linear in cost, there exist \( \beta, C_1, C_2 \) and \( C_3 \) such that

\[ \frac{t(\beta, C_1) - t(\beta, C_2)}{C_1 - C_2} \neq \frac{t(\beta, C_1) - t(\beta, C_3)}{C_1 - C_3}. \]

Define \( \epsilon_i \equiv C_i - [\beta - e^*(\beta)]q^*(\beta) \), and consider the family of discrete distributions with three atoms at \( e_1, e_2 \) and \( e_3 \) and no weight elsewhere (since these distributions can be approximated by continuous distributions, we could actually restrict ourselves to continuous distributions). It is clear that by varying the weights on the three disturbance levels and given the last equation, the first equation cannot always be satisfied.

B.7 Effect of the bureaucratic bias

Proof of Lemma 4.1.

Differentiating equations (13) and (14), in order to \( \delta \) we obtain:

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
S^n \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} = -(1 + \lambda) \left( \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} + 1 \right) + k \\
\psi^n \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} = \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} - \left( \frac{\lambda}{1 + \lambda} \right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi^n \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta}
\end{array} \right. \]  \( \Leftrightarrow \)
Using Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), we find that \( \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} > 0 \) and \( \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} > 0 \) (with \( 0 \leq k \leq 1 \)).

**Proof of Lemma 4.2.**

The expected social welfare function is given by:

\[
W^* = \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[ q^*(\hat{\beta}) - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ -\delta \left[ q^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi \left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] + \left[ \hat{\beta} - e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] q^*(\hat{\beta}) \right\} + \right.
-\lambda V^*(\hat{\beta}) \ d\hat{\beta}.
\]

It can be written as:

\[
W^* = \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} S \left[ q^*(\hat{\beta}) - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ -\delta \left[ q^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \psi \left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] + \left[ \hat{\beta} - e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] q^*(\hat{\beta}) \right\} + \right.
-\lambda \left\{ V^*(\hat{\beta}) - \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} \psi \left[ e^*(\gamma) \right] d\gamma \right\} d\hat{\beta}.
\]

Using the Envelope Theorem we find:

\[
\frac{dW^*}{d\delta} = (1 + \lambda) \left\{ \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} q^*(\hat{\beta}) d\hat{\beta} - q_{ref} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \right\} = (1 + \lambda) \left[ \int_{\beta}^{\hat{\beta}} q^*(\hat{\beta}) d\hat{\beta} - q_{ref} \right].
\]

**Proof of Lemma 4.3.**

We know that both \( e^*(\hat{\beta}) \) and \( q^*(\hat{\beta}) \) are increasing in \( \delta \). Using equation (14) we can rewrite (16) as:

\[
K^*(\hat{\beta}) = 1 - \frac{\left( \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda} \right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi'' \left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right]}{q^*(\hat{\beta})}.
\]

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Therefore:

\[
\frac{dK^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} = -\left( \frac{\lambda}{1 + \lambda} \right) (\hat{\beta} - \beta) \psi''\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} q^*(\hat{\beta}) - \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} \psi''\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] q^*(\hat{\beta})^2.
\]

Thus, \( \frac{dK^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} > 0 \) if and only if:

\[
\psi''\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} q^*(\hat{\beta}) - \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} \psi''\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] < 0 \iff \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} > \frac{\psi''\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] q^*(\hat{\beta})}{\psi''\left[ e^*(\hat{\beta}) \right]}.
\]

From the expressions for \( \frac{dq^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} \) and \( \frac{de^*(\hat{\beta})}{d\delta} \) in Lemma 7, the condition above is always true when \( \psi'' \) is null. Therefore, we may conclude that, in this case, \( K^*(\hat{\beta}) \) is increasing in \( \delta \) for any value of \( \hat{\beta} \).

\[\square\]

C Appendix: The prospective payment system

C.1 Problem of the government

Necessary conditions

Consider problem (26). The Hamiltonian is:

\[
H = S \left\{ q(\hat{\beta}) - (1 + \lambda) \left[ V(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \left( q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right) + \psi [e(\hat{\beta})] + \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) \right] q(\hat{\beta}) \right] + V(\hat{\beta}) - k\delta \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) - q_{ref} \right] + \nu \left[ -q(\hat{\beta}) \right] \right\},
\]

where \( \nu \) is the multiplier associated with (22). The Pontryagin principle yields:

\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial q} = S' \left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] - k\delta - \nu = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial e} = - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ \psi' \left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] - q(\hat{\beta}) \right\} = 0,
\]

\[
\nu'(\hat{\beta}) = - \frac{\partial H}{\partial V} = \lambda.
\]
Furthermore, \( \beta \) is a free boundary so that

\[
\nu(\beta) = 0. \tag{61}
\]

Integrating (60) and using (61), we obtain

\[
\nu(\hat{\beta}) = \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta).
\]

Substituting in (59) above:

\[
S'\left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] = (1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e(\hat{\beta}) - \delta \right] + k\delta + \lambda(\hat{\beta} - \beta).
\]

**Sufficiency conditions**

The second order derivatives of the Hamiltonian (58) are:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial q^2} = S''\left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] < 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial e^2} = -(1 + \lambda) \psi''\left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] < 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial q \partial e} = 1 + \lambda.
\]

The determinant of the Hessian is:

\[
|H| = -(1 + \lambda) S''\left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] \psi''\left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda)^2.
\]

\[
|H| > 0 \iff S''\left[ q(\hat{\beta}) \right] \psi''\left[ e(\hat{\beta}) \right] > 1 + \lambda.
\]

We find that \( |H| > 0 \), by Assumption 1 (ii).

**C.2 Effect of the bureaucratic bias**

**Lemma** C.1. *The output, \( q^*_p(\hat{\beta}) \), and the effort, \( e^*_p(\hat{\beta}) \), are increasing in \( \delta \).*

*Proof.*
Differentiating equations (27) and (21), in order to \( \delta \) we obtain:

\[
\begin{align*}
S'' \frac{dq^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{d\hat{\beta}} &= -(1 + \lambda) \left( \frac{de^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{d\hat{\beta}} + 1 \right) + k \\
\psi'' \frac{de^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{d\hat{\beta}} &= \frac{dq^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{d\hat{\beta}} \Rightarrow \\
\frac{dq^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{de^*_p(\hat{\beta})} &= \frac{\psi''(k-1-\lambda)}{S''}\frac{k-1-\lambda}{\psi''+1+\lambda}.
\end{align*}
\]

Using Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), we find that \( \frac{de^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{d\hat{\beta}} > 0 \) and \( \frac{dq^*_p(\hat{\beta})}{d\hat{\beta}} > 0 \) with \( 0 \leq k \leq 1 \).

\[\square\]

**Lemma C.2.** The expected social welfare, \( W^*_p \), increases (decreases) with the bureaucratic bias, \( \delta \), whenever the expected output level, \( \int_{\hat{\beta}} q^*(\beta) \alpha d\hat{\beta} \), is larger (lower) than the reference output, \( q_{\text{ref}} \).

**Proof.**

The expected social welfare function can be written as:

\[
W^*_p = \int_{\beta}^\beta S \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] - (1 + \lambda) \left\{ \psi \left[ e_p^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] - \delta \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) - q_{\text{ref}} \right] \right\} - \\
- (1 + \lambda) \left[ \hat{\beta} - e_p^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) - \lambda \left[ V_p^*(\beta) - \int_{\beta}^\beta q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] d\hat{\beta}.
\]

Using the Envelope Theorem we find:

\[
\frac{dW^*_p}{d\delta} = (1 + \lambda) \left\{ \int_{\beta}^\beta q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) d\hat{\beta} - q_{\text{ref}}(\bar{\beta} - \beta) \right\} = (1 + \lambda) \left\{ E_{\beta} \left[ q_p^*(\hat{\beta}) \right] - q_{\text{ref}} \right\}.
\]

\[\square\]

**References**


