



2009 Ecore Summer School on Market Evolution and Public Decision

Brussels, June 9-12, 2009

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

8:30-9:00 Registration and welcome coffee (44, avenue Jeanne – 1050 Brussels).

Plenary session I

9:00 Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego)
Lecture 1 – Other-Regarding Preferences, Theory and Evidence.

10:30 Break

11:00 David AUSTEN-SMITH (Northwestern University)
Lecture 1 – The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Committee Design.

12:30 Welcome lunch

14:00-15:30 Parallel session A1: Public Decision and Asymmetric Information.

Vanessa VALERO (University of Montpellier I), *Government Opportunism in Public-Private Partnerships*.

Frédéric MALHERBE (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), *Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups*.

Sandra POLANIA REYES (University of Sienna), *Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: a Preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy*.

14:00-15:30 Parallel session B1: Networks and Fairness.

Giacomo VALLETTA (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *The Shapley Value for the Fair Allocation of an Indivisible Good*.

Luca Paolo MERLINO (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), *Endogenous Job Contact Networks*.

Roland PONGOU (Brown University), *A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS*.

15:30 Break



16h00-17:30 Parallel session A2: Political Economy 1.

Galina ZUDENKOVA (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), *Split-Ticket Voting: an Implicit Incentive Approach*.

Benno BÜHLER (Toulouse School of Economics & University of Munich), *Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics (and Elsewhere)*.

Marie-Louise LEROUX (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *Voting on Pensions: Sex and Marriage*.

16h00-17:30 Parallel session B2: Industrial Organization.

Alexandre de CORNIERE (Paris School of Economics), *Advertising on a Search Engine: How to Target Consumers ?*

Ming GAO (London Business School), *When to Allow Buyers to Sell? – Bundling in Mixed Two-Sided Markets*.

Esra DURCEYLAN (Bilkent University), *Managerial Effort, Agency, and Industrial Evolution*.

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Plenary session II

9:00 David AUSTEN-SMITH (Northwestern University)
Lecture 2 – Information Aggregation in Large Elections.

10:30 Break

11:00 Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego)
Lecture 2 – Other-Regarding Preferences in Markets: Identification and Welfare.

12:30 Lunch (not organized by the summer school)

14:00-15:30 Parallel session A3: Information Economics.

Evrin DENER (Southern Methodist University), *Signaling Quality Through Prices in a Durable Good Market*.

Mark LE QUEMENT (European University Institute), *Cheap Talk, Information Acquisition and Conditional Delegation*.

Pinghan LIANG (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), *Customer Complaint Management: a Mechanism Design Approach*.



14:00-15:30 Parallel session B3: Endogenous Institutions.

Konstantinos MATAKOS (University of Warwick), *Endogenous Choice of Electoral Rules in a Multi-Party System with Two Major Dominant Parties.*

Daniil MUSATOV (New Economic School, Moscow), *Stable Jurisdiction Partitions under Monotonically Decreasing Population Density.*

Osiris Jorge PARCERO (United Arab Emirates University), *Dynamics of Neighborhood Formation and Segregation by Income.*

15:30 Break

16h00-17:30 Parallel session A4: Network and Moral Hazard.

Gilles GRANDJEAN (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *Connections among Farsighted Agents.*

Renaud BOURLES (University Toulouse 1 & GREQAM), *Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance, Classification Risk and Prepayment.*

Heiko KARLE (Mannheim University), *Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers.*

16h00-17:30 Parallel session B4: Regulation.

Sebastian KRANZ (University of Bonn), *Legal Unbundling Can Be a Golden Mean Between Vertical Integration and Ownership Separation.*

Ana BORGES (Universidade do Porto), *Using Cost Observation to Regulate Bureaucratic Firms.*

Renaud FOUCART (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), *On the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans in Restaurants.*

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Plenary session III

9:00 Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego)
Lecture 3 – Institution Design when Incentives Influence Preferences.

10:30 Break

11:00 David AUSTEN-SMITH (Northwestern University)
Lecture 3 – Deliberation in Committees.

12:30 Lunch (not organized by the summer school)



14:00-15:30 Parallel session A5: Investment and Market Regulation.

Irina SULEYMANOVA (German Institute for Economic Research), *Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport Systems: a Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-Up Problem.*

Maria Eugenia SANIN (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *Trading Emission Permits under Upstream-Downstream Strategic Interaction.*

Nese SARA (Southern Methodist University), *Bilateral Trade Liberalization between Asymmetric Countries.*

14:00-15:30 Parallel session B5: Dynamical Games.

Chantal MARLATS (Paris School of Economics), *A Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Stochastic Games.*

Antonio OSORIO DA COSTA (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), *Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty.*

Paolo PIACQUADIO (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *Equity and Efficiency in an Overlapping Generation Model.*

15:30 Break

16h00-17:30 Parallel session A6: Incentives and Decision.

Paul STEFFENS (Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam), *On the Burden of Accountability.*

Philippos LOUIS (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), *Learning Aversion and Voting Rules in Collective Decision Making.*

Guido MARETTO (California Institute of Technology), *Contracts with Aftermarkets.*

16h00-17:30 Parallel session B6: Cooperation, Charity and Career Concern.

Jean BEUVE (Université Paris XI & I), *Reputation, Contracts and the Dynamics of Cooperation. Theoretical and Experimental Approaches.*

Olivier BOS (Paris School of Economics and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *Charitable Asymmetric Bidders.*

Rosa FERRER (Vanderbilt University), *The Effect of Lawyers' Career Concerns on Litigation.*

19:00 Dinner



Friday, June 12, 2009

Plenary session IV

9:00 Eric MASKIN (Institute for Advanced Study)
Lecture 1 – Voting Theory 1.

10:30 Break

11:00 Eric MASKIN (Institute for Advanced Study)
Lecture 2 – Voting Theory 2.

12:30 Lunch (not organized by the summer school)

14:00-15:30 Parallel session A7: Bargaining and Signaling.

Bing YE (Toulouse School of Economics), *Pricing for Bargaining ?*

Wooyoung LIM (University of Pittsburgh), *Communication in Bargaining over Decision Rights.*

Susanne OHLENDORF (University of Bonn), *Signaling an Outside Option.*

14:00-15:30 Parallel session B7: Political Economy 2.

Laurent BOUTON (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), *Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser: The Ortega Effect.*

Sivan FRENKEL (Tel Aviv University), *Unambiguous Campaign as a Signal of Competence in Electoral Competition.*

Veronika BLOCK (University of Karlsruhe), *Preferences over Coalitions.*

15:30 Break

16h00-17:30 Parallel session A8: Lobbies and Politicians.

Allard VAN DER MADE (University of Groningen), *Endogenous Group Formation and Lobbying.*

Dimitrios XEFTERIS (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), *Referenda as a Catch-22.*

Anton BELYAKOV (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), *On the Relation of Country Size to the Form of Government.*

16h00-17:30 Parallel session B8: Taxation, Growth and Income Inequality.

Filippo GREGORINI (University of Milan), *Political Geography and Income Inequalities.*



Christian KIEDAISCH (Toulouse School of Economics), *Patents in a Model of Growth with Persistent Leadership.*

Tapas KUNDU (University of Oslo), *Resistance to Outside Investment: a Rational Model of Surplus Destruction.*

This event is organized jointly with PGPPE (an ESF research Networking programme), ARC project "Market Evolution, Competition, and Policy: Theory and Evidence", ERC grant 208535 - Market Design and the Evolution of Market (MaDEM)