|Phone #:||0032 2 650 3839|
|Main Field:||Industrial Organization, Contracts and Auctions|
|Second Field:||Development Economics|
|Third Field:||Environmental Economics|
I hold a Ph.D. and a MSc. in economics and statistics from Université Libre de Bruxelles. I also hold a MSc. in economie-mathematique et econometrie from Univerity of Tunis. My current research focuses on the efficient design of development policies with an interest in foreign aid. My research includes also the efficient design of linked contracts and their application to international environmental negotiations.
Previously, I worked for an EHS regulatory consultancy. I performed regulatory analysis of environmental and health & safety policies for more than 14 countries. I have also conducted and participated to on-site EH&S audits of industrial facilities.
An Empirical Model for U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation.
Development Aid Effectiveness: when is reputation worth an in-
Aid and LDCs: Financial Transfers or Infrastructure Projects?
Tradable Emission Rights and the Impact on Industrial Performances.
Graduate Microeconomics (graduate)
|PhD Advisor:||Prof. Patrick Legros|
|PhD Subject and Resume:||My current research focuses on the design of effective policies for economic development with an application to foreign aid. My work contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on aid effectiveness and explores the ability of aid to achieve its goals in the presence of both incentives and informational problems. My dissertation consists of three essays dealing with a particular aspect of donor policies that may impact the effectiveness of aid: ex-post conditionality and the role of reputation in inducing compliance with aid contracts, the optimal choice of aid modalities; and finally, the drivers of aid allocation among recipient countries.|