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Erika Deserranno, LSE Print
Friday, 23 May 2014, 12:15 - 13:15

Erika Deserranno, London School of Economics

Earning Expectations and Selection of Social Workers: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Uganda

Abstract: While there exists large evidence on the incentive e?ffects of compensation on worker productivity, very little is known on the selection eff?ects. In a context where workers' motivation is a strong predictor of productivity, the direction of the selection e?ffect is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher compensation may increase the skills in the application pool; on the other hand this may come at the cost of attracting candidates with weaker motivation. In this study, I investigate selection eff?ects in the recruitment of Community Health Promoters (CHP) in Uganda. To do so, I design an experiment that creates random variation in the recruitment strategy by advertising the CHP position either as a high-pay, middle-pay or low-pay position. I ?find that increasing expected earnings helps the recruiter fi?ll vacancies more quickly as it attracts a larger quantity of applicants. This however comes at the cost of attracting applicants with lower quality, i.e. lower pro-sociality, who will drop out more rapidly and perform worse.



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