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Avner Seror, PSE Print
Friday, 13 October 2017, 12:15 - 13:15

ENTER Seminar

Avner Seror, Paris School of Economics

Multi-candidate Political Competitions and the Industrial Organization of Politics

Abstract: We show in this paper that under standard axioms of behavior, probabilistic voting models are equivalent to a random utility model as long as the noise in voting decisions is distributed according to some Fréchet distribution. The framework then allows for a tractable analysis of multi-candidate elections and provides a new approach to the industrial organization of politics. After establishing the conditions for the existence, the unicity and the convergence of an Electoral Equilibrium with an arbitrary number of candidates, we present applications of a version of the model with endogenous entry of political parties to various issues in political economy, such as redistributive politics, public policies under different electoral rules, and franchise extension in democracies and kleptocracies.


Location: R42.2.113
Contact: Nancy De Munck - This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it