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Michael Blanga-Gubbay, ECARES Print
Thursday, 07 December 2017, 16:00 - 17:00

Michael Blanga-Gubbay, ECARES

Globalization for Sale

Abstract: We study the political economy of trade agreements with heterogeneous firms. We first uncover new stylized facts about lobbying on free trade agreements (FTAs). Using detailed information from lobbying reports on FTAs negotiated by the United States, we show that only large firms lobby individually, and always in favor of trade agreements. Moreover, lobbying firms are larger than non-lobbying firms and larger firms spend more on FTAs. To rationalize these findings, we develop a model in which large and small firms coexist in the same market and study their decision to lobby in favor or against a proposed FTA. In this setting, we show that small firms will never lobby. By contrast, large firms will lobby in favor of the agreement — and the magnitude of their contributions will increase in their size — if politicians are biased against it.  

Location: R42.2.107
Contact: Nancy De Munck - This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it