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Mikhail Freer, ECARES Print
Friday, 27 October 2017, 12:15 - 13:15

Mikhail Freer, ECARES

Nonparametric Utility Theory in Strategic Settings: Revealing Preferences and Beliefs from Games of Proposal and Response
Abstract: We explore conditions under which behavior in a strategic setting can be rationalized as the best response to some belief about other players’ behavior. We show that a restriction on preferences, which we term quasi-monotonicity, provides such a test for a family of ultimatum games. Preferences are quasi-monotone if an agent prefers an allocation that improves payoff at least as much as that of others. In an experiment, we found that 94% of proposers make choices that are arbitrarily close to quasi-monotone preferences and beliefs. We also found that 65% of responders were consistent with quasi-monotone of preferences, and 90% of responders made inconsistent choices in no more that 5% of decision problems. We found little support for convexity of preferences.

Location: R42.2.113
Contact: Nancy De Munck - This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it