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Thierry Magnac, TSE Print
Tuesday, 16 October 2018, 14:00 - 15:15

Thierry Magnac, Toulouse School of Economics

A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets

Abstract : Recruiting agents, or "programs," costly screen "applicants" in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can be used as a Pigouvian tax. Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with di erent application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality. 


Location: R42.2.113
Contact: Nancy De Munck - This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it