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Amrish Patel, U. East Anglia Print
Tuesday, 26 March 2019, 14:00 - 15:15

Amrish Patel, University of East Anglia

 Communication as Gift-Exchange

Abstract : We study psychological games of cheap talk communication involving players who have misaligned material interests and reciprocity preferences. We find that full and efficient information transmission is often impossible if reciprocity concerns are too high. Furthermore, higher material preference misalignment may facilitate the achievement of full information transmission. A key driver of our results is that truth-telling is not per se a kind action by the sender. We contrast discrete and continuous environments, alternative conceptions of reciprocity preferences and consider one-sided reciprocity models. 

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