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Micael Castanheira, ECARES Print
Friday, 16 November 2018, 12:15 - 13:15

Micael Castanheira, ECARES

Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions

Abstract : This paper revisits the economic effects of constitutions. We propose a model of governmental resource allocation under political competition and contrast majoritarian and proportional representation systems. We derive predictions regarding the relationship between local --sub-district-- level characteristics and inequality in government intervention. Looking at a local level and introducing heterogeneity allows us to uncover a novel sprinkling effect of electoral competition. This effect can incentivize politicians to allocate resources more equally under multi-district majoritarian elections than under proportional representation. We identify conditions under which this effect more-than-offsets the incentive to target swing districts identified in the literature. Finally, we explore implications for the size of government and the trade-off between targeted transfers and global public goods.

Location: R42.2.113
Contact: Nancy De Munck : This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it