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Pierre Dehez, CORE, UCL Print
Monday, 29 September 2008, 12:30 - 13:30

Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion

Pierre Dehez, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain

Abstract :

A group of firms considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements held by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how firms should be compensated for the goods they hold. It is shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game to which standard cost sharing rules like the Shapley value or the nucleolus can be applied and compared.

(This is joint work with D. Tellone.)

Location: ULB - S 12.227
Contact: Claude Adan, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it