2009 Summer School
Market Evolution and Public Decision
June 9-12, 2009
Plenary sessions will take place in Room Dupréel (44, av. Jeanne) from 9:00 to 12:30.
Parallel Sessions A will table place in Room Dupréel (44, av. Jeanne) from 14:00 to 17:30
Parallel Sessions B will table place in Room Baugniet(44, av. Jeanne) from 14:00 to 17:30
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Plenary session I
9:00 Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego): Lecture 1 – Other-Regarding Preferences, Theory and Evidence. REFERENCES
11:00 David AUSTEN-SMITH (Northwestern University): Lecture 1 – The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Committee Design.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session A1: Public Decision and Asymmetric Information.
Vanessa VALERO (University of Montpellier I), Government Opportunism in Public-Private Partnerships.
Frédéric MALHERBE (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups.
Sandra POLANIA REYES (University of Sienna), Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: a Preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session B1: Networks and Fairness.
Giacomo VALLETTA (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), The Shapley Value for the Fair Allocation of an Indivisible Good.
Luca Paolo MERLINO (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), Endogenous Job Contact Networks.
Roland PONGOU (Brown University), A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session A2: Political Economy 1.
Galina ZUDENKOVA (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Split-Ticket Voting: an Implicit Incentive Approach.
Benno BÜHLER (Toulouse School of Economics & University of Munich), Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics (and Elsewhere).
Marie-Louise LEROUX (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), Voting on Pensions: Sex and Marriage.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session B2: Industrial Organization.
Alexandre de CORNIERE (Paris School of Economics), Advertising on a Search Engine: How to Target Consumers ?
Ming GAO (London Business School), When to Allow Buyers to Sell? – Bundling in Mixed Two-Sided Markets.
Esra DURCEYLAN (Bilkent University), Managerial Effort, Agency, and Industrial Evolution.
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Plenary session II
9:00 David AUSTEN-SMITH (Northwestern University): Lecture 2 – Information Aggregation in Large Elections.
11:00 Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego): Lecture 2 – Other-Regarding Preferences in Markets: Identification and Welfare.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session A3: Information Economics.
Evrim DENER (Southern Methodist University), Signaling Quality Through Prices in a Durable Good Market.
Mark LE QUEMENT (European University Institute), Cheap Talk, Information Acquisition and Conditional Delegation.
Pinghan LIANG (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), Customer Complaint Management: a Mechanism Design Approach.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session B3: Endogenous Institutions.
Konstantinos MATAKOS (University of Warwick), Endogenous Choice of Electoral Rules in a Multi-Party System with Two Major Dominant Parties.
Daniil MUSATOV (New Economic School, Moscow), Stable Jurisdiction Partitions under Monotonically Decreasing Population Density.
Osiris Jorge PARCERO (United Arab Emirates University), Dynamics of Neighborhood Formation and Segregation by Income.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session A4: Network and Moral Hazard.
Gilles GRANDJEAN (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), Connections among Farsighted Agents.
Renaud BOURLES (University Toulouse 1 & GREQAM), Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance, Classification Risk and Prepayment.
Heiko KARLE (Mannheim University), Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session B4: Regulation.
Sebastian KRANZ (University of Bonn), Legal Unbundling Can Be a Golden Mean Between Vertical Integration and Ownership Separation.
Ana BORGES (Universidade do Porto), Using Cost Observation to Regulate Bureaucratic Firms.
Renaud FOUCART (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), On the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans in Restaurants.
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Plenary session III
9:00 Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego): Lecture 3 – Institution Design when Incentives Influence Preferences.
11:00 David AUSTEN-SMITH (Northwestern University): Lecture 3 – Deliberation in Committees.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session A5: Investment and Market Regulation.
Irina SULEYMANOVA (German Institute for Economic Research), Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport Systems: a Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-Up Problem.
Maria Eugenia SANIN (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), Trading Emission Permits under Upstream-Downstream Strategic Interaction.
Nese SARA (Southern Methodist University), Bilateral Trade Liberalization between Asymmetric Countries.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session B5: Dynamical Games.
Chantal MARLATS (Paris School of Economics), A Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Stochastic Games.
Antonio OSORIO DA COSTA (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty.
Paolo PIACQUADIO (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), Equity and Efficiency in an Overlapping Generation Model.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session A6: Incentives and Decision.
Paul STEFFENS (Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam), On the Burden of Accountability.
Philippos LOUIS (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), Learning Aversion and Voting Rules in Collective Decision Making.
Guido MARETTO (California Institute of Technology), Contracts with Aftermarkets.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session B6: Cooperation, Charity and Career Concern.
Jean BEUVE (Université Paris XI & I), Reputation, Contracts and the Dynamics of Cooperation. Theoretical and Experimental Approaches.
Olivier BOS (Paris School of Economics and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), Charitable Asymmetric Bidders.
Rosa FERRER (Vanderbilt University), The Effect of Lawyers' Career Concerns on Litigation.
Friday, June 12, 2009
Plenary session IV
9:00 Eric MASKIN (Institute for Advanced Study): Lecture 1 – Voting Theory 1.
11:00 Eric MASKIN (Institute for Advanced Study): Lecture 2 – Voting Theory 2.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session A7: Bargaining and Signaling.
Bing YE (Toulouse School of Economics), Pricing for Bargaining ?
Wooyoung LIM (University of Pittsburgh), Communication in Bargaining over Decision Rights.
Susanne OHLENDORF (University of Bonn), Signaling an Outside Option.
14:00-15:30 Parallel session B7: Political Economy 2.
Laurent BOUTON (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser: The Ortega Effect.
Sivan FRENKEL (Tel Aviv University), Unambiguous Campaign as a Signal of Competence in Electoral Competition.
Veronika BLOCK (University of Karlsruhe), Preferences over Coalitions.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session A8: Lobbies and Politicians.
Allard VAN DER MADE (University of Groningen), Endogenous Group Formation and Lobbying.
Dimitrios XEFTERIS (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), Referenda as a Catch-22.
Anton BELYAKOV (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain), On the Relation of Country Size to the Form of Government.
16:00-17:30 Parallel session B8: Taxation, Growth and Income Inequality.
Filippo GREGORINI (University of Milan), Political Geography and Income Inequalities.
Christian KIEDAISCH (Toulouse School of Economics), Patents in a Model of Growth with Persistent Leadership.
Tapas KUNDU (University of Oslo), Resistance to Outside Investment: a Rational Model of Surplus Destruction.
Accomodation for speakers: If a participant is selected to present her/his paper, we will cover up to 5 nights in a selected hotel. Speakers are asked to share a room (in this case, the hotel will bill us directly). Speakers who do not want to share the room are free to ask for a single room, but she/he will have to pay the accommodation at check out, and we will cover up to 55 eur / night. The number of single rooms is limited and the negotiated rate for a single room is 94 eur/night.
Concerning travel expenses, for speakers coming from a University not involved in a network with ECARES and CORE (e.g, PAI, …), we will cover up to 100 eur for travels from an EU country, and up to 150 eur for travels from outside EU. Speakers from Universities involved in a network with ECARES and CORE (e.g., PAI, …) , are asked to ask for funding in their own University.
Scholars who want to participate without presenting a paper should send an email to Nancy de Munck (
). For those participants we will cover neither the travel expenses nor the lodging. Deadline for inscription is June1st.
Practical information: The Summer School will take place in Bruxelles, at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.
Contact: Nancy De Munck (
) and Sylvie Mauroy (
This event is organized jointly with
PGPPE (an ESF research Networking programme)
ARC project "Market Evolution, Competition, and Policy: Theory and Evidence"
ERC grant 208535 - Market Design and the Evolution of Market (MaDEM)