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Andrea Mattozzi, Caltech Print
Tuesday, 15 December 2009, 14:00 - 15:30


Andrea Mattozzi, Caltech

Abstract: In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could afford to recruit better individuals. Further, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional electoral systems than in majoritarian electoral systems.

Location: S 12.227
Contact: Claude Adan, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it