Menu Content/Inhalt
Seminars Print
previous year previous month next month next year
See by year See by month See by week See Today Search Jump to month
Alice Mesnard, IFS Print
Tuesday, 11 May 2010, 14:00 - 15:30

Controlling Illegal Migration:  Selling Visas or Repression?"

Abstract : We study how smugglers may respond to different types of policy measures, such as sale of migration visas or border's enforcement, by changing the price they propose to illegal migrants, which affects the number and type of migrants. In this context a government that aims at dismantling smugglers and controlling migration flows faces a trade-off. Dismantling smugglers by the sale of migration visas necessarily increases the total number of migrants and lowers their average skill level. In contrast, a repressive policy such as increasing the costs for smugglers to operate decreases the number of migrants and increases their average skill level but reinforces the smugglers' abusive power as they apply higher prices. We show, however, that a package of both types of measures may be effective at dismantling smugglers' businesses and controlling migration flows, without necessarily increasing the budget deficit. We then calibrate the model to quantify some of its implications.

Alice Mesnard, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London

Location: S 12.227
Contact: Claude Adan, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it