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David Myatt, Oxford U. Print
Tuesday, 26 April 2011, 14:00 - 15:15

On the Rational Choice Theory of Voter Turnout

Abstract: I consider a two-candidate plurality-rule election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are instrumentally motivated. The unique equilibrium predicts significant turnout under reasonable parameter configurations, and greater turnout for the underdog offsets the expected advantage of the perceived leader. I also present clear predictions about the response of turnout and the election outcome to various parameters, including the importance of the election; the cost of voting; the perceived popularity of each candidate; and the accuracy of pre-election information sources, such as opinion polls.

David Myatt, Oxford University

Location: R 42.2.113
Contact: Claude Adan, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it