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Axel Gautier Print
Monday, 14 November 2011, 12:00 - 13:30

Axel Gautier, Université catholique de Louvain

Rethinking Regulatory Capture

Abstract: Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the revolving doors model.  To avoid socially costly capture, the political principal should then either implement collusion-proof mechanisms through the delegation of welfare gains, or severely restrict the career paths of regulatory staff. The paradox of capture is that neither the two modes of capture, nor the remedy are commonly found in practice. This paper proposes to rethink capture based on the widespread use of industry- commissioned consultants, experts and lobbyists that produce information for regulatory and policy use.

Location: ULB - R42.2.113
Contact: Claude Adan, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it