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Juuso Välimäki, University of Helsinki Print
Tuesday, 06 December 2011, 14:00 - 15:15

Juuso Välimäki, University of Helsinki

Delay and Information Aggregation in Stopping Games with Private Information

Abstract: We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with informational externalities. A number of players have private information about a common payo§ parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. The players learn from each other in a continuous-time multi-stage game by observing the past investment decisions. We characterize the symmetric equilibria of the game and we show that even in large games where pooled information is su¢ ciently accurate for first best decisions, aggregate randomness in outcomes persists. Furthermore, the best symmetric equilibrium induces delay relative to the first best.

Location: R42.2.113
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