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Bob Staiger, Stanford U. Print
Tuesday, 05 June 2012, 14:00 - 15:15

Bob Staiger, Stanford University

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Trade Disputes and Settlement

Abstract: We study the optimal design of remedies for breach in a trade agreement through a model that highlights the role of transaction costs, renegotiation and settlement "in the shadow of the law," and where a court can imperfectly verify whether breach has occurred. The model delivers predictions about the outcomes of trade disputes -- the propensity of countries to settle early versus "fighting it out," and to renegotiate court rulings versus implementing them -- and how these outcomes correlate with the optimal breach remedies. We examine these predictions in light of data on the outcomes of actual trade disputes in the GATT/WTO.

Location: R42.2.113
Contact: Claude Adan, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it

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